

Marx I: Orthodox Theory

A. Marx's Early writings

1. Critique of Liberalism (Jewish Question)
 - a. Illusion of religious emancipation (freedom)
 - b. Fragmentation of life and person with separation of realms
 - 1) Economic
 - 2) Political
 - 3) Religious
 - c. This came with liberal or bourgeois revolution, as against feudal society
 - d. Granting civil liberties simply opens the way for economic oppression and egoism (breakup of communal relations)
 - 1) Only real rights are property rights
 - 2) Therefore the essence of liberalism is the police
 - e. Human nature actually requires communal life and reconciliation of fragmentation of social world
 - f. Revolution would emancipate people in this fashion and remove the need for illusory religious emancipation ("opiate of the masses")
2. Critique of Hegel
 - a. Discovery of the proletariat
 - 1) Radically excluded from all of bourgeois civil society
 - 2) Their emancipation would emancipate all of society because of negation
 - b. Calls for proletarian revolution

- c. Retained this philosophical (and Hegelian) framework throughout his career: sought scientific justification of it
- B. "Scientific" writings in political economy
- 1. Estranged labor
 - a. Human nature or essence in act of production: (re-)produces distinctive personality
 - b. Separation of immediate producers from ownership
 - 1) Divides all of society into two classes: capitalists and proletariat
 - c. Disrupts human nature and causes problems for both capitalists and workers
 - 1) Separation from object
 - 2) Estrangement from life-activity
 - 3) Estrangement from fellow humans (and workers)
 - 2. Later political-economic theory (Wage-Labor and Capital; Capital)
 - a. Commodities with exchange value
 - 1) Corresponds to (socially necessary) labor time contained
 - b. Labor-power becomes a commodity with emergence of wage-labor
 - 1) owner is worker
 - c. But consumption of labor power in process of production creates greater value than it costs to produce (subsistence)
 - 1) This produces surplus value
 - d. When capitalist buys labor power, he gets more (exchange) value than it costs him because of surplus value. But all exchanges are for equal value and therefore formally fair.

- e. Two real questions:
 - 1) Who controls surplus value, the immediate producer (the worker) or the purchaser of labor power (the capitalist)
 - a) This produces class struggle
 - 2) Should control of surplus value be divided in this fashion, or should everyone contribute both to planning and to production
 - a) This overcomes class struggle and divisions within human nature
- f. Ultimately, the answers to these questions are political, because the capitalist system is politically enforced

Marx II: Theory of History and Extensions

C. Theory of History (German Ideology, Contrib to Critique)

1. Materialism
 - a. Base, Superstructure
 - b. Political forms are built on economic forms
 - c. Consciousness (ideology) also derives from economic forms and class position
2. Historical Change comes from dissonance between base and superstructure
 - a. Relations of production become fetters for forces of production
 - b. Revolution overcomes the dissonance, and development continues
3. Lower classes become the future ruling classes, and their revolutionary impulses drive history forward - assuming they carry a new form of production with them that builds on and overcomes previous form
4. Thus, proletarian revolution is part of historical process

D. Applied History (Communist Manifesto)

1. Assumptions
 - a. History is history of class struggle and will only come to an end when class struggle is overcome
 - b. Class struggle is a political struggle, and the State is the means of oppression of the dominant class
 - 1) Therefore, the subordinate classes always attempt to overthrow the State
 - c. Consciousness (ideas, ideology) comes from material conditions
2. Rising Bourgeoisie was revolutionary
 - a. Revolutionized production
 - b. Revolutionized the State and ideology

3. Bourgeoisie centralizes all production and hence all political power into its own hands
4. Capitalist production drives all intermediate classes out of existence and creates the proletariat
5. But the bourgeoisie loses control of everything it has brought into existence: the process of production, and its work-force (the proletariat)
6. The modern industrial proletariat is brought into existence by capitalism
 - a. It is the negation of all bourgeois traits
 - b. It is created from the ruins of the lower middle class (petty bourgeoisie)
 - c. It is organized and centralized in factories like an army
7. From its concentration, the proletariat feels its own power and organizes politically - first in unions, then in the vanguard (communist) party
8. Capital centralizes on a world-wide scale
 - a. This creates world history for the first time
 - b. Soon, there are virtually no capitalists left but the remaining few, who hold all ownership and power
 - c. But capital has completely organized - and socialized - production
 - 1) The remaining few capitalists are no longer necessary to guide production
 - 2) They simply suck up the surplus
9. The Proletarian Revolution simply removes these last vestiges of the capitalist class
 - a. The revolutionary proletariat inherits fully organized production
 - b. Since the proletariat now constitutes virtually all of society, no class difference remain

- 1) (Recall that classes are based on relations to the mode of production)
 - c. Since no classes now remain -
 - 1) The State can wither away
 - 2) Class struggle can end
 - 3) History (which is the history of class struggle) can end
 - d. The Revolution is the negation of the negation
- E. Contradictions in Concrete History (Capital I/8, Eighteenth Brumaire)
1. Intermediate classes are not driven out (e.g. peasantry)
 2. State is not controlled by economically dominant classes
 3. The State has an independent existence
 - a. It effects and controls the economy
 - b. Its army and bureaucracy have their own bases of power and ideology
- F. Extensions and modifications to Marx's theory
1. Relative Deprivation
 2. False Consciousness and Hegemony
 3. Bonapartism
 4. Theory of Imperialism
 - a. Third World Proletariat
 - b. World System and Dependency
- G. Critiques - of virtually every point
1. Politics and consciousness do not derive from economic bases: often, it is the reverse

2. The intermediate classes will not be driven out in the development of capitalism
 - a. Capitalism encourages the creation of many small owners
 - b. Capitalists themselves are displaced by salaried managers
 - c. Workers also become owners through their pension funds
3. Working classes will not become emiserated
 - a. Working-class emiseration is an effect of industrialization, not capitalism
 - b. Workers become affluent in Western countries
 - c. Third world countries experience emiseration due to industrial development, but if they are capitalistic, the wealth trickles down to the working classes
 - 1) Prime examples of East-Asian capitalist countries like Japan and South Korea
4. The working classes will not become revolutionary
 - a. Partly since they are not concentrated
 - b. Their consciousness does not automatically follow from their situation, nor will they necessarily draw the same conclusions from their situation as do the theorists
5. State will not wither away
 - a. Bureaucracy will grow according to same dialectic as Marx describes
6. Belief in revolution is a faith like religious faith
 - a. Sustained lower-status people in times of suffering
 - b. Has decayed throughout the world in developed and semi-developed countries - not least in the Soviet bloc and China

- c. Remains primarily in pre-industrial, Third World areas
 - 1) Revolutionary faith may be best seen as an ideology of industrial development: a way to get cooperation from those who suffer the burden of industrialization

Weber I: Economics, Society, and Politics

- A. Weber's writings are not holistic, and political sociology is only one of several topics
 - 1. Religion and Economics
 - 2. Economic History
 - 3. Methodology or Philosophy of Social Science

- B. An attempt to make Weber's writings parallel Marx's (as Orum does) would distort them
 - 1. Weber does not assume that economic formations and social class are the basic elements from which politics flow
 - 2. Political organization follows its own imperatives, often unaffected by class and economics
 - a. Indeed, politics often influences class and economics
 - 3. Also, values and ideology often influence class and economics, rather than the other way around, as we will see

- C. Economic History and Social Class
 - 1. Religious influences
 - 2. Political influences
 - 3. Endogenous Economic development

- D. Puritanism and Capitalism
 - 1. Observation the capitalism largely arose in Calvinist countries
 - 2. Speculated that this was due to the psychological inner needs of believers to know if they were of the elect
 - a. Led them to exert themselves economically: inner-worldly asceticism
 - b. Surplus was reinvested, not consumed, and capitalism grew
 - c. Success in the world led to temptation to consume, but economic system now enforced capitalistic behavior (Iron Cage)

3. It was very difficult to prove this speculation because it assumed that psychological disposition led to capitalistic behavior - but capitalistic behavior was taken as an indicator of psychological disposition
4. Thus, Weber later moved to a theory of dualistic vs. unitary ethics
 - a. Systemic consequences were the same

E. Politics and Capitalism

1. Most usual and simplest form of acquisition was military conquest
 - a. Question why modern capitalism turns to peaceful acquisition
2. Citizenship
 - a. Citizenship is a political and military concept, but also an economic and cultural concept
 - b. Historically, citizens of cities also engaged in military conquest
 - 1) Ancient western and Oriental cities were seats of empires that were militarily dominant, and their citizens could engage in acquisition through conquest
 - 2) But medieval western cities were not militarily dominant: the feudal lords of the countryside were dominant, and the cities could manage no more than sufficient defense
 - 3) Thus, citizens of medieval cities were forced to acquire by producing a surplus in production
 - c. Their resulting wealth reinforced the conflict between them and the feudal aristocracy because the latter wanted to raid them
 - d. But the towns allied with the crown
 - 1) The monarchs were initially only the first among equals, but they wanted to centralize power

- 2) The town-crown alliance had common enemies in the feudal aristocrats
- 3) They also had a coincidence or complementarity of interests, because the monarchs could strengthen the towns militarily and the towns could provide resources to the monarchs in their attempts to centralize power and fight their neighboring monarchs
- e. The town-crown alliance succeeded, and this had two crucial, related consequences
 - 1) The emergence of a centralized nation-state with a powerful bureaucracy and army
 - 2) The expansion of capitalism into a pacified countryside, and the emergence of a national capitalist class
3. Mercantilism helped aid capitalism, but it did not encourage “rational” capitalism
4. Rational, bureaucratic politics helped capitalism more by providing predictable laws
 - a. But the creation of the centralized, bureaucratic nation-state eventually made the monarch and remaining aristocracy obsolete: their functions were only marginally necessary
 - b. Bureaucratic nation-state could now become formally democratic
 - 1) There was no change in the power of the state
 - 2) I will discuss the meaning of democracy later
5. Note that although ancient-western and Asian empires were also bureaucratic, they were not capitalistic because they never went through the phases that western society went through: they could continue to engage in acquisition through conquest
 - a. However, nothing stops non-western societies from adopting capitalism and more rational state forms once western societies demonstrate their power
 - b. Indeed, many Asian (and some western) economies appear to be succeeding better with forms of neo-mercantilist capitalism than are western free-market economies

- c. A long history of political centralization, unalloyed by feudal decentralization sometimes helps here

Weber II: Political Formations

- F. Weber's political sociology is in the classical tradition of classifying Regime Forms (follows Aristotle, Montesquieu, Tocqueville)
1. This is also a comparative-historical, inductive, and empirical tradition, rather than an abstract, holistic, and deductive tradition
 2. Thus, it stands in contrast to Marx and Parsons
 3. But other representatives of pluralist political sociology are in the same tradition: Parsons is not the only pluralist
- G. "Class, Status and Party"
1. Defines class mainly as does Marx (and Adam Smith) as relations to the forces of production
 - a. But he also defines class in terms of "life chances," or marketable skills: thus, in terms of human (not physical) capital, or training and education
 - b. Argues against Marx and Lukacs that class position does not necessarily determine consciousness, nor can it predict political organization and action
 - c. This is partly due to the cross-cutting influences of other principles of stratification like status
 2. Defines status mainly in terms of honor and prestige - or more trivially, in terms of consumption and life style
 - a. Really derives from aristocratic principles
 - b. Involves opposition to market principles
 - c. Ethnic and caste distinctions may be special cases of status distinctions - but as we will see, they are often crucial in explaining political alignment and action

3. Party is a pure form of political organization

- a. Weber argues that much in politics flows, not from social bases, but from organizational bases
- b. Thus, parties are pure instruments of power and can be organized in a variety of ways, not all directly connected to social bases - including bureaucracy, patronage, etc. (more later)

H. The concepts of domination and legitimacy

1. Domination: probability that commands will be accepted

- a. From Herrschaft: etymology
- b. NB Interest in compliance
- c. Necessity of a Staff
 - 1) Form of staff defines form of legitimacy

2. Legitimacy: acceptance of claims of domination

- a. Question: what is sociology of this popular acceptance
- b. also NB: Hobbesian subversive democratic element
 - 1) However hierarchical, rule must be accepted

I. Three Pure types of Authority

1. Legal/rational, Bureaucratic

- a. Implicit critique of Marx: socialism simply replaces bourgeois rulers with bureaucratic rulers
- b. Modern bureaucracy taken as point of departure
- c. NB Legal norms (norms vs. rationality)

d. Characteristics

- 1) Rule-bound
- 2) Impersonal
- 3) Hierarchical
- 4) Specialized
- 5) Separated from ownership
- 6) Career

e. Efficient and powerful

- 1) Contrast to dilettantism
- 2) Indifference to capitalism or socialism
- 3) Extremely powerful (but NB later: also brittle)
- 4) Bureaucracy can only be overthrown by another bureaucratic organization
- 5) Domination through knowledge, official secrets

2. Traditional

- a. Sanctity of age-old rules and powers
- b. Obedience not to rules but to persons
- c. Patriarchalism
- d. Patrimonialism - sultanism
- e. Estate-type (ständische): feudalism

- 1) benefices & fiefs
- 2) judicial & military

f. Effects on economy

- 1) only certain forms of capitalism possible under empires

3. Charismatic

- a. Tautological: exists when believed in
- b. communism of followers
- c. revolutionary with regard to traditionalism
- d. foreign to economic considerations

4. Combinations of the pure types (262ff)

- a. Forms of belief almost always mixed
- b. Importance of education & culture (265)
- c. NB comments about the breakdown of bureaucratic authority in Germany, 1918

1) Problem of anarchy: brittleness

J. Routinization of Charisma: General considerations

1. problem of succession
2. can be traditionalized or rationalized
 - a. NB charisma of person or of office
3. Interests of staff
4. anti-economic character must be altered to be routinized

K. Routinization of Charisma: Feudalism

1. NB reciprocity

L. Routinization of Charisma: Democratic direction

1. NB his skepticism about classical theories of democracy as the rule "of the people"
 - a. He assumed that democracy, is a form of legitimate domination like any other; and this entails authoritative leadership
 - b. cf. Michels' Iron Law of Oligarchy - even in connection with socialist parties and movements
2. a form of rationalization
3. NB Führerdemokratie: devotion to leader
4. anti-authoritarianism generally moves in direction of rationality
5. NB collegiality not necessarily democratic
6. Only Western collegial bodies capable of expropriating monarch
 - a. monarch had become dilettante

7. Separation of powers in West began on estate basis
8. Parties
 - a. to secure power
 - b. patronage, ideological
9. Administration
 - a. direct democracy (he doubts)
 - b. administration by notables
 - 1) inadequate on large scale
 - c. Representation
 - 1) appropriated
 - 2) estate-type
 - 3) instructed
 - 4) free
 - a) elections
 - b) parties
 - c) NB relation of this democracy to capitalism (296f)
 - calculable law
 - capitalism emerged before extension of franchise
 - but also NB undermining of old status groups
 - 5) agents of groups

Pluralism I: Parsons and Functionalism

- A. Functionalism and Durkheim
 - 1. Darwinian Elements (& Spencer)
- B. Norms and Values
 - 1. Socialization and Freud
- C. Deviance and Alienation
- D. Legitimation
- E. Social Change: Differentiation, Integration, Strain
 - 1. Question of Conflict
 - 2. Industrial Revolution & Smelser
 - 3. Uneven Development

Pluralism II: Variants and Topics

F. Variety of levels of analysis in pluralism

1. Quintessentially democratic theory
 - a. Explains how values are translated, or interests are reconciled, into government policy
 - b. Has trouble explaining non-democratic political systems except as less-developed
 - c. Has trouble explaining problems in democracy except as dysfunctions that can and must be resolved
 - d. Marxian and Weberian analyses explain these non-democratic elements more easily and directly
2. Methodological individualism over institutionalism
3. Functionalist vs. Voluntarist perspectives
 - a. Functionalism emphasizes the centrality of values embedded in social structure: individuals express and act on these values according to their place in the scheme of things
 - b. Voluntarism emphasizes social psychology: individuals act on their interests and interact to create system-level outcomes
4. Rational Choice
 - a. Methodologically individualistic
 - b. Only partially voluntaristic: individuals always follow the dictates of rationality
 - c. Utilitarianism and Democratic Theory
 - d. Problem of deriving where interests originate
 - e. Problem of analyzing collective/institutional constraints on actors

G. Political Culture: The Realm of Values

1. A political culture corresponds to a regime form
 - a. Democratic political culture supports democratic institutions: democracy has trouble surviving without citizen support
 - b. A form of legitimation
 - c. A source of inputs necessary for the functioning of the regime
2. Socialization: The Creation and Reproduction of Values
 - a. The individual level: family reproduction of values
 - b. The macro-level: the creation of values
 - 1) It may be treated historically: pluralism sometimes does this episodically
 - 2) It may be treated in terms of development (differentiation and reintegration)
 - 3) Pluralism has more trouble treating this question systematically
3. Subcultures
 - a. Distance from consensual center or -
 - b. Alienation from the consensual center (deviance) or -
 - c. Expression of fundamental lines of interest-conflict

H. Participation: The Operation of Pluralist Politics

1. Participation as democratic input
 - a. Expression of values and response of leaders
2. Interest Aggregation
 - a. Values (Public Opinion) to -
 - b. Movements to -
 - c. Parties and Voting to -
 - d. Government and Policy

3. Participation as Protest
 - a. Protest as inputs: signal-sending
 - b. Protest as breakdown of social (self-)control, including beliefs in efficacy or sub-political structures (family, church, etc.)
 - c. Protest as safety-valve: harmlessly letting off steam until new roles are reintegrated
- I. Social Capital
 1. James Coleman
 2. Robert Putnam
- J. Institutional Analysis: Democratic Responsiveness
 1. Response to, and reflection of, individual value-inputs
 2. The reconciliation of competing interests
- K. Legitimation
 1. Efficacy and Trust: oriented especially to democratic model of input and response
 2. Alienation
- L. Critiques
 1. Analysis of systemic power ignored
 - a. Economic and Class Power (Marx): The influence of the economically powerful is virtually ignored
 - b. State and Bureaucratic Power (Weber): The State is virtually ignored except as an arena for the resolution of conflicts
 2. No analysis of constraints and construction of values
 - a. Constraints on socialization (functionalist variant)

- b. Constraints on choices (rational-choice variant)
- 3. Values are viewed as different from interests
 - a. Perhaps people simply follow their interests
 - b. Pluralist response: if nothing besides interests held society together, conflict would be much more radical and/or people would not participate as much as they do
- 4. Unrealistic assumption of equal power among all individuals and organizations

State Creation I: The Growth of Centralized States

A. State vs. Nation

B. Functionalism and Modernization Theory

1. Economic development
2. Urbanization, communications, mobility
3. Decline of Gemeinschaft (family, community, church) in favor of Gesellschaft
4. Societal complexity and State capacity
 - a. Huntington and State capacity
 - b. SSRC Committee on Political Development's "Crises and Sequences"
 - 1) Equality, Capacity, Differentiation
 - 2) Identity, Legitimacy, Penetration, Participation, Distribution
 - 3) Question of stability
 - 4) Examples of different sequences
 - a) GB, B, USA, Scan: I, L, Par, Pen/Dist
 - b) Germany, Russia: Pen, all other loads simultaneously
5. Role of Social Groups (see Orum)
 - a. Shils: Intellectuals (esp. those trained in advanced countries) either help integrate change, or if they are alienated, are revolutionary modernizers (nationalistic or communistic)
 - b. Huntington: Military can be modernizers in very backward countries, but as they develop, they can be conservative and simply authoritarian
 - c. Wolf (more Marxist theory): Peasants react when commercial agriculture impinges on them. They are often led by intellectuals, military, or parties. As society develops, their sector narrows and their protests become less important.

C. Marxism and Economic Influence on State Formation

1. Marx's own theory of bourgeois revolution for control of the state
2. Marx's theory of Bonapartism
 - a. Needs of accumulation: need for state's help
 - b. Problems of control, esp. contradiction of bourgeois democratic ideology and proletarian majority (more later in discussion of democracy)
3. Lenin's theory of Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism
 - a. Internationalizes production: capitalists in imperialist states, proletariat in third world empire
 - b. Imperialist state acts to enforce this structure of international capitalist
 - c. Multinational companies: problem of supranational capitalism in which state no longer acts in capital's interests
4. Wallerstein and World Systems theory
 - a. Core capitalist countries and periphery (and semi-periphery) countries

D. Weberian Analysis and State Control

1. Elite competition and rationalization
 - a. Tilly and others on State capacity and control
2. Dialectic of State centralization: Military, Revenues, Bureaucracy
3. Military is agent of external expansion and internal repression and enforcement
4. Revenues (taxation) are extracted from civil society to pay for military. State desires as productive a social base (e.g. capitalism) as possible in order to produce maximum revenue.

5. Bureaucracy is rational organization (capacity) of state for control and revenue collection
6. Tilly's half-tongue-in-cheek comparison to mafia warfare
7. Causal elements: elite competition
 - a. Internal: Town-Crown alliance against the aristocracy
 - b. External: Influence of neighboring States and their armies
 - 1) Exception: naval military did not necessitate strong state (e.g. Britain)
8. Problems
 - a. Question of agency: who brings state into being, for what reasons and in what interests
 - b. As capacity of civil society to produce revenue rises, it tends to rebel against heavy control from above and extraction. This can be seen from a Marxist or a functionalist perspective

State Creation II: The Development of Democracy

A. Weber's Theory

1. Elite competition: town-crown vs. aristocracy
2. Question of state centralization (ref. Tocqueville). Incomplete centralization in the development of Western feudalism established the concept of rights and immunities. Since the crown could not centralize without bourgeois allies, it was forced to extend some of these rights and immunities to them. These were later extended to other sectors of the population (working class, women, ethnic/racial minorities, younger people) with the extension of the franchise.
3. Neo-Weberian theories (e.g. Tilly) posit that democracy emerged most easily in non-centralized states with less powerful armies and bureaucracies.

B. Marx's theory

1. Two-stage revolutionary process
 - a. Bourgeoisie establishes incomplete bourgeois democracy against aristocracy
 - b. Proletariat creates true democracy, socializing property, against bourgeoisie
2. Theories of class hegemony: an ideological question in which the repressive potential is internalized
3. Gören Therborn: A Semi-Orthodox Marxist Theory
 - a. Proletariat has never been able to commit revolution on its own strength (it was also never large enough)
 - b. Has always needed allies: foreign armies, other domestic allies, splits in the bourgeoisie
4. Barrington Moore: A Class-Balance of Power
 - a. Unclear whether this is a strictly Marxist theory
 - b. Democracy was introduced by a strong middle class

- c. Depended on two types of balance among classes
 - 1) Balance of power between crown and aristocracy, such that neither was able to overwhelm the bourgeoisie
 - 2) No alliance between the bourgeoisie and aristocracy for the purpose of suppressing the lower orders: proletariat and peasantry
 - d. If these balances not fulfilled, there were two consequences
 - 1) Crown-aristocratic alliance led to arrested development
 - 2) Bourgeois-aristocratic alliance led to fascistic, repressive, modernizing regime
- C. My synthesis of pluralist/Weberian theories
- 1. A Social Action/Interaction Theory (see paper for week 10, "Political Culture...")
 - 2. Democracy as a second-order good: necessarily depends not on the strength of groups, but on their relative strength and interaction
 - a. This is a critique of both Marxist and Weberian theories: groups would rather win. Problem is to explain their self-restraint.
 - 3. Support for democracy of groups/parties depends in part on sequence of development
 - a. SSRC crises and sequences theory as applied to democracy
 - b. Lipset's theory of working-class radicalism
 - 4. Democracy depends in part on configuration of balance of power and position of extremist groups
 - a. Sartori's problem of polarization vs. competition for the center
 - b. Coalitions and blocked alternance: question of veto power
 - c. Dynamic of collapse includes both these elements (polarization and blockage) in a vicious circle and destructive gamesmanship

5. Unimportance of economic factors because they are filtered through sequence, ideological interpretation of problems, and configuration of alternatives.

D. Other theories

1. Social scientists are still casting about for ways to explain recent democratizations since 1945, since the mid-1970s, since 1989, and since 9/11
2. Huntington's (1991) theory of the "Third Wave"
 - a. The "Third Wave" of democracy (1974-90) came after two previous waves, each of which was followed by a reversal: in 1820s-1926 (reversals in 1922-42) and post-1945 (reversals in 1960-75).
 - b. The Third Wave was helped by five factors:
 - 1) The "performance legitimacy" problems of authoritarian regimes.
 - 2) The global economic growth of the 1950s-60s. Most rich countries are democratic, and most poor countries are not. In between is a "political transition zone." Many of the third-wave countries passed through this zone at this time, and the East European countries were already rich enough but held back by the USSR.
 - 3) The Catholic Church's shift to a pro-democracy stance after Vatican II (1963-65).
 - 4) The policy shifts of the US, USSR, EC - especially constant support of the US, the EC's offer of membership only to democracies, and the USSR's demise.
 - 5) "Snowballing" or demonstration effects of other transitions. This affected primarily leaders. It especially had a big effect in Eastern Europe when the obstacle of the USSR was removed: this opening up is unlikely in any future regions, nor did the US or the EC have much influence in the remaining regions.
 - c. Past reverse waves have been caused by (1) weak democratic values among elites and masses, (2) economic crises, (3) polarization, especially after leftist reforms, (4) conservative attempts to exclude the left or working classes, (5) breakdown of law and order due to terrorism, (6) foreign conquest, (7) "reverse snowballing."

- d. With few exceptions, democracies have not ended due to a popular vote or popular revolt. Most breakdowns were military or executive coups.
 - e. At present, most alternatives to democracy are discredited, but with a reinvigorated authoritarianism somewhere and an economic crisis, reverse snowballing could take place.
 - f. He is skeptical of the cultural-determinant thesis, especially with regard to non-western Christianity, Confucianism, and Islam.
 - 1) Past arguments have not held up well, like Catholicism's supposed resistance to democracy or Asian resistance to capitalism.
 - 2) These cultures are complex, and certain strains within them may prove compatible to democracy. They are changing and dynamic, and may adapt.
 - g. Current obstacles to democratization after the Third Wave: in China, political, economic, and cultural; in Africa, mainly economic; in developing East Asia and Islamic countries, mainly cultural.
3. Linz and Stepan's (1996) theories of Democratic Transition and Consolidation
- a. Definitions
 - 1) Democratic transition: Freely elected government with de facto power, which does not have to share de jure power with other bodies.
 - 2) Consolidated democracy: Democracy is the "only game in town." Behaviorally: no significant actors trying to bring in other form of regime. Attitudinally: most of population favors democracy. Constitutionally: actors habituated to solving disputes through democratic institutions.
 - b. Five arenas of a consolidated democracy: (1) civil society, (2) autonomous political society, (3) rule of law, (4) state bureaucracy, (5) institutionalized economic society.
 - c. "Stateness," nationalism, and democratization
 - 1) A state is needed for democracy because democracy requires citizens, a status established by membership in a state.

- 2) State policies must guarantee equal citizenship rights for all nationality and ethnic groups.
- 3) Policies should encourage multiple and complementary identities, and not polarize.
 - a) PR, consociationalism, and federalism help.
 - b) Inaugural elections at the federal, rather than regional, level helps.
- d. Four types modern non-democratic regimes
 - 1) Authoritarian
 - 2) Totalitarian
 - 3) Post-Totalitarian
 - 4) Sultanistic
- e. Only certain transition paths are available for given regime types
 - 1) Pacts are only possible from post-totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, not from totalitarian or sultanistic. In the latter cases, there are no moderates for the typical four-player game.
 - a) Yet pacted transitions can delay democratic consolidation if they institutionalize power of non-democratic players or delegitimate parties.
 - b) Also note that democracies do not have to be built by democrats. Non-democratic elites and masses can become pro-democratic by their experience with democracy.
 - 2) Extrication by hierarchically-led military is available only for authoritarian regimes
 - 3) Defeat in war may be necessary for other types, but military conquest only helps transitions, not consolidations.
- f. International influence can aid democratization
 - 1) Zeitgeist and diffusion effects. The more alike countries are, the more likely diffusion will take place. Modern communication also aids this.

- g. Level of economic development correlates with regime type, but economic performance is not the most important factor in transition and consolidation
 - 1) Prolonged prosperity undermines authoritarian regimes by raising the costs of repression. Yet economic crises hurt nondemocratic regimes because they depend on performance.
 - 2) Democratic regimes, even new ones, are less sensitive to economic crises. They depend on procedure not performance, and elections can change policies.
 - 3) If there is no perceived regime alternative, a nondemocratic regime may continue to rule despite economic crisis. This is also true for democracies, but alternative administrations may be tried before alternative regime forms.

- h. Democratization should come before economic reforms
 - 1) “Stateness” problems in particular must be resolved before economic reforms can be addressed.
 - a) The state must have the capacity to set policy.
 - b) Ethnic and nationality tensions must be defused.
 - 2) Citizens have more patience with economic policy than with getting the regime established.

Alignment and Cleavage Structure

A. Distinctions among Politically-relevant Social Cleavage

1. Three types:

a. Positional

- 1) Ascriptive: e.g., race, ethnicity, gender
- 2) Social Structural: e.g., social class

b. Ideological

c. Behavioral or “act” cleavages, especially those of membership

2. Another distinction is between latent and actual cleavages around which politics are mobilized

- a. Some scholars talk about a continuum from a new social division or issue, to a (protest) movement, to a politicized movement, to a political party. Along the way, a latent cleavage becomes politicized.

B. Persistence of Political Alignment along Cleavage Lines

1. Persistence of the Cleavages

2. Institutionalization of Parties and/or Power Structures

3. Socialization

C. Marxian Theory

1. Social Class is the only “real” cleavage

2. Class consciousness and political action are parts of social class

a. Parallel conditions do not constitute a social class

- 1) “Sack of potatoes”
- 2) Classification vs. Networks (manifold relations)

3. False consciousness stems from various conditions
 - a. Undeveloped class conditions
 - b. Efforts of upper classes to divide the revolutionary class
 - 1) Religion as opiate of the masses
 - 2) Racial, ethnic, gender divisions in contemporary capitalist societies stem from bourgeois' efforts to divide the working class
4. Secondary labor markets create social divisions (not true class divisions) that reflect divisions within capital
 - a. Primary sector is world-competitive; big labor has organized it
 - b. Secondary sector is uncompetitive and unremunerative; big labor has trouble penetrating it
 - c. Government sector must compete with primary sector for workers; although it is not heavily organized, workers' conditions approximate those in the primary sector

D. Parsonsian Theory

1. Seymour Martin Lipset & Stein Rokkan combines Parsonsian and Weberian theory. Four sets of relevant cleavages in Western societies correspond to historical lines of conflict:
 - a. Reformation: Center (Catholicism) vs. Periphery (Protestantism)
 - b. National Revolution: National (Established) Church vs. Dissenting Churches and Secularism; secondarily, between national core populations and ethnic minorities
 - c. Industrial Revolution: Traditional agrarian elites vs. Modern urban/industrial elites
 - d. Proletarian Revolution: classical Marxist split between employers and workers in the industrial sector
 - e. Lipset and Rokkan were able to account for much of Western party structures along these lines

- f. Unclear how necessary Parsonsian theory is for this account

E. Weberian Theory

1. There are other bases besides class
 - a. Status: could be broadened to include ethnicity, race, religion, language, region, etc.
 - b. Party: Iron Law of Oligarchy
2. Cleavages based on authority (Dahrendorf)
 - a. This is relevant because, with the rise of bureaucracy, ownership of the means of production no longer accurately describes social stratification
3. Theories of Post-Industrial Society
 - a. End of class struggle, end of ideology (Bell)
 - 1) Decline of class voting (Lipset, Political Man)
 - 2) Rise of "new politics" alignments (Inglehart, Dalton): more on this in a moment and in lectures on voting
 - b. Cycles of protest will produce disharmony (Huntington)
 - 1) A gap between (constant) ideals and (imperfect) institutions produces, in turn:
 - a) complacency (ignore gap),
 - b) hypocrisy (deny gap),
 - c) moralism (eliminate gap),
 - d) cynicism (tolerate gap).
 - 2) Disappointment at limited accomplishments of moralism breeds cynicism.
 - 3) Accomplishments of the 1960s/1970s: civil rights, ending war in Vietnam.
 - 4) Temporary effects: strengthening the media and Congress, and weakening the Presidency and parties.

- c. Post-materialism (Inglehart): product of peace and prosperity
 - 1) Satisfaction of material needs gives rise to struggle for needs of expressiveness and community
 - 2) Theory has fed into explanations for ecology movement and Green parties
 - 3) “New politics” (post-materialism) vs. “Old politics” (materialism) is reflected in 1960s generation gap:
 - a) e.g., new left ecologists who want to save environment vs. old left labor unionists who want to preserve jobs
 - 4) But post-materialism does not explain “new materialism” of the Yuppies of the 1980s or the revival of religious fundamentalism among fairly affluent populations

Ideology and Values: Theories of Whole Populations

- A. Marxian Theory: Rather simple and shallow
 - 1. Values and ideology derive from material conditions
 - 2. Dominant ideology of a society is determined by the ruling class
 - 3. Revolutionary ideology is developed by a small segment of the ruling class that goes over to the revolutionary class
 - a. Democratic aristocrats like Montesquieu or Tocqueville went over to the bourgeoisie
 - b. Socialist bourgeois like Marx go over to the working class
 - 4. More sophisticated variants
 - a. Lukacs theory of class consciousness
 - b. Gramsci's theory of cultural hegemony
- B. Other non-Marxian theories of material determination of ideology and values
 - 1. e.g. Mannheim
- C. Parsonsian Value-based theory
 - 1. Values generate social structure
- D. Weberian Interaction theory
 - 1. Elective Affinities
 - 2. Indeterminate or reciprocal causality
- E. Political Culture
 - 1. Has been treated in a materialist manner (Marxian or not) that says values simply derive from material conditions

2. Has been treated in a fairly strictly Parsonsian value-based manner
 - a. Almond and Verba's Civic Culture
 - 1) Surveys of five countries (US, UK, D, I, Mex) to see what citizen factors most support democracy
 - 2) Takes a fairly pluralist-functionalist approach: citizen input to government is reflected in policy output
 - b. Three types of political orientation
 - 1) Parochial: apolitical
 - 2) Subject: oriented to State outputs, not citizen inputs
 - 3) Participant: oriented to both State outputs and citizen inputs
 - c. Democracy works best when there is a large mix of participant orientation, but when citizens do not participate so much as to overload the system: need representative functions
 - 1) For this, there must be trust in other citizens and in representatives
 - 2) This is called a Civic Culture
 - d. Later writers criticized Almond and Verba's approach from a number of directions
 - 1) Barnes and Kaase, et al., did not so much criticize the Parsonsian framework as say that citizens could participate much more than Almond and Verba asserted: 1960s-70s protest demonstrations did not harm democracy (more later)
 - 2) Other writers criticized Almond and Verba from a materialist, institutionalist, or rational choice perspective
 - 3) Almond and Verba later protested that their approach was not strictly Parsonsian (value derived), but they did not concretely specify how material factors affected values
3. Has been treated in a Weberian manner: reciprocal causality from values to structure. This is my approach.

4. The relative autonomy of political culture
 - a. The idea of a substratum like language, socialized values, or folkways/mores
 - 1) Political institutions and structures affect political culture and vice versa
 - b. Pro-democratic political values affect democratic political structure
 - 1) Democratic values can help prevent the growth of anti-democratic parties or movements
 - 2) Democratic values can thus help prevent polarization or political paralysis (lack of alternance, veto blocs)
 - c. Well-functioning political institutions support pro-democratic political values
 - 1) Direct Effects: the longer the institutions survive, the stronger the values should be in the population
 - 2) Comparative Preferences: the more attractive other regimes appear, the more attractive the values associated with them; or the more attractive a new regime, the more attractive its values relative to the values of the old regime

Ideology and Values: Population Segments and Value-Reproduction

F. Subcultures and Socialization

1. The population is not uniform with regard to values and ideology
2. Marxists and materialists say that differences are due to different interests
 - a. e.g., the poor are more alienated
 - b. Marxists also talk about the reproduction of values: a justification of bourgeois capitalism through ideology, indoctrination, hegemony
3. Parsonsians say that differences are due to different levels of socialization. Lesser socialization produces less support. Those further from the core, central values are less socialized.
 - a. Thus, those on the periphery are less supportive
 - b. The better educated are more supportive of democratic norms
 - 1) Parsonsians tend to universalize this finding to the better educated everywhere - incorrectly, as I will indicate in a moment
4. My research from an interactionist perspective shows more complexity
 - a. The better educated are more supportive of the regime in place, except that they may anticipate a change to democracy. Thus, the better educated under authoritarianism may be more authoritarian.
 - b. Generations or cohorts have a tendency to support the values that were important in their formative period, although older generations can eventually catch up after a major change (e.g. regime change)
 - c. These differences are magnified by how well or poorly political institutions perform
 - d. I have found very few class, ethnic, or gender differences with regard to democracy and tolerance, once education and cohort are taken into account

- 1) But there are often class, ethnic, and gender differences around issues that are relevant for these groups

G. Issue Publics, Value Change, and Realignment

1. In a stable, well established social and political environment, social cleavages correspond to stable values or ideology and a stable party system
 - a. This is how parties perform their representative function: they aggregate constituencies to form majorities for policy creation
 - b. This may happen within parties, as in America
 - c. This may happen between parties, as in multi-party parliamentary systems
2. Social and value-change can make the existing political parties less relevant for voters
 - a. New parties may emerge
 - b. Old parties may change their positions to attract new constituencies
 - c. If neither happens, there may be a period of de-alignment in which the population is alienated from all parties and turnout or participation declines
3. Inglehart claims that social cleavages have become less important, and value cleavages more important
4. Likewise, Dalton notes the rise of single-issue politics in Western countries: "issue-publics" arise around various problems (abortion, pollution, etc.)
 - a. If existing parties cannot respond to new issues or aggregate constituencies, existing party loyalties (party ID) may decline
 - b. If the new issues are all parallel, a partisan realignment may occur, and new party ID will grow
 - c. If the new issues do not go together, dealignment may occur, and party ID will remain low

Party Systems and Voting I: Characteristics of Party Systems

A. Lipset and Rokkan's thesis of Cleavages and Parties

1. Parliament and the enfranchisement of new constituencies
2. Four sets of relevant cleavages in Western societies correspond to historical lines of conflict:
 - a. Reformation: Center (Catholicism) vs. Periphery (Protestantism)
 - b. National Revolution: National (Established) Church vs. Dissenting Churches and Secularism; secondarily, between national core populations and ethnic minorities
 - c. Industrial Revolution: Traditional agrarian elites vs. Modern urban/industrial elites
 - d. Proletarian Revolution: classical Marxist split between employers and workers in the industrial sector
3. Lipset and Rokkan claimed that these cleavages characterized the party system of Western countries from the 1920s to the mid-1960s (their date of publication)
4. Rose and Urwin's confirmation in 1970

B. Party System characteristics

1. Volatility
 - a. Changes in the party system
2. Fragmentation
3. Polarization
 - a. Sartori's theory of Polarized Pluralism
 - 1) NB Downsian models
 - b. Subsequent research and my modifications

4. Consequences of Voting Laws

- a. Single-member plurality vs. PR, plus Mixed systems (e.g., Germany)
- b. Building coalitions within or between parties
- c. Posited consequences for turnout
- d. Redistricting as a mid-course between SMP & PR, and the case of America since the Civil Rights movement. Lack of polarization in the population, polarization of Congressmen and non-polarization of Senators (e.g., Clinton impeachment votes)

1) Also cf. At-Large voting in municipalities as PR (Lani Guinier)

C. Why No Socialism - or Working-Class Party - in America: Cleavages and Ideology

1. It is not true that there is no Egalitarianism or Militancy in America

- a. American democracy was one of the first expressions of political egalitarianism, and American populism is one of its recurrent forces - often stronger than in other democracies
- b. Workers were more militant in America than in any other Western industrial country: the labor movement was much more violent, but also less socialistic.

2. Several Historical factors are usually cited

- a. There was no historical aristocracy in America, and thus, less opposition to egalitarianism and populism. America was born middle class.
- b. Class rigidities were less in America than in other countries. This was partly due to the open frontier and the double migration to the East Coast and to the Frontier.
- c. The heterogeneity of the American population interfered with the solidarity needed for socialist ideology: it split the working class.
 - 1) Paradoxically, slavery - the greatest inequality in American history - may have contributed here by making poor Southern whites, and later working-class Northern whites, fearful of black gains.

- 2) Immigration had similar effects.
 - d. There is an inertial tendency for values to be reproduced by socialization. Thus, if socialist ideology had trouble starting early, it did not become easier for it to start late.
3. Some more recent factors
- a. Some think the best time for the adoption of socialist values is during industrialization or the high period of industrialism.
 - 1) This corresponds in America, roughly, from the late 19th century to about the 1950s.
 - 2) This was indeed the period of greatest success for socialist ideology.
 - b. Daniel Bell has argued that since World War II, there was an exhaustion or end of all ideologies in all Western societies - partly in revulsion to the extremes of fascism and Stalinism
 - c. Bell also argued that with the coming of post-industrialism, the social basis for socialism has also eroded
 - 1) The industrial working class has shrunk
 - 2) Collectivist social life has declined in favor of privatized social life. And post-industrial work conditions do not encourage the communications needed for collectivist orientations.
 - d. But Bell's observations do not mean that political ideology has become more moderate - just moved further away from traditional socialism and traditional conservatism.
 - e. The New Left since the 1960s is not especially socialistic
 - 1) It is militant and sometimes populist, but this is not new in America
 - 2) It is part of the splintering of American politics with the rise of single-issue movements described earlier

- f. Footnote: The New Right of the Reagan era is not especially conservative in the traditional sense
 - 1) It called on the older American traditions of populism and militancy. The New Right surprised some analysts who forgot that these traditions are separate from and pre-date socialist ideology in America.
 - 2) But it is potentially as unstable as the New Left because it is built on the same splintering of politics
 - 3) It remains to be seen how long-lasting the Reagan realignment is. If it doesn't last, it may simply be an episode of dealignment.
4. The renewed debate about the decline - or non-decline - of class voting
 - a. Jeff Manza & Clem Brooks
 - 1) Redefined class according to various new-class theories
 - 2) Applied multinomial logistic regression
 - 3) Fairly conventional findings: small business on right, highly educated professionals on left; evolving place of the state
 - b. Lipset & Terry Clark
 - 1) Object to too much redefinition of class

Party Systems and Voting II: Voting

D. Voter Alignment until 1970

1. Michigan tradition of American voting studies
2. Butler and Stokes on Britain
3. Rose, ed., on cross-national studies

E. Realignment

1. Burnham's account of American history
2. Nie and Verba
3. Inglehart's Post-materialism thesis
4. The question of a Reagan realignment

F. Dealignment

1. Dalton's review of the findings
 - a. Class voting: decline
 - b. Religious voting: little change
 - c. Values, Issues, Ideology: rise
 - d. Party ID: decline
 - e. Fragmentation and Issue Publics: rise

G. Changes in Party Systems since 1970s

1. Some note rise in indicators of instability, especially volatility (Daalder and Mair 1983)
2. Partly on the basis of Inglehart's Post-materialism thesis

3. Cross-pressured constituencies: some of the main political battlefields after the 1970s (see my outline of party realignment in week 14 for fuller picture)
 - a. Working-class conservatives: economically liberal, socially conservative
 - b. Yuppies: economically conservative, socially liberal
 - c. Lower middle class conservatives have been the political beneficiaries of many of the changes, especially with politicians like Reagan and Thatcher. The new conservatism contains elements that appeal to them.
 - 1) Populism, opposition to big labor and big government, and nationalism/patriotism/militarism (NB similarity to fascism).
 - 2) Easy credit that unites upper and lower middle classes: they can invest and consume more easily.
 - 3) Lip service to traditional values of family, church, community - but the new conservative parties do little concrete to support them.
 - 4) Many de-organized new working-class voters support new conservative parties because they support most issues and can overlook the opposition to organized labor and government assistance. However, the more marginal their economic position is with respect to the middle class, the less stable is their adherence to the new conservative parties. In an economic downturn, they may well desert these parties if the liberal parties have not given up economic liberalism in the meantime.
 - d. Middle-class liberals (old New Dealers, old 60s New Leftists) have been left politically homeless in recent alignments.
 - 1) The old working-class parties are leery of them because their constituencies are socially conservative and often fear ecological politics: prefer economic growth.
 - 2) Most of the new Ecology movements and Green parties do not attract mass constituencies. Most working class voters mistrust them as anti-growth; lower middle class conservatives are simply repelled; middle/upper-middle class voters continue to support traditional conservative parties; minorities distrust their interest as faddish and volatile.

- e. Minorities are some of the strongest supporters of traditional left parties, especially the poorest of the minorities. However, new conservative parties have openings among minority constituencies on two grounds.
 - 1) The more affluent minorities can be appealed to on economic growth bases.
 - 2) The more traditionalist minorities (e.g. Fundamentalist blacks, religious or traditional Hispanics) can be appealed to on socially conservative grounds - to the extent that new conservatives shed the racist component of their social conservatism.
 - 3) The new conservatives have not yet begun to appeal to minority voters in earnest.
 - 4) New left parties (Greens, etc.) have tried, but the social gap is extreme, and their adherence to economic populism (growth) is too weak.
- f. Women (the gender gap)
 - 1) Issues that pull them left tend to be associated with women's changing positions in society (sexual revolution, labor force participation): divorce, birth control, abortion (all these especially in Catholic countries like Italy or Spain), equal pay. Pacifism has also emerged recently as a women's issue: seems to be anti-Macho and children-oriented, but its sources are still unclear.
 - 2) Issues that pull them right tend to be associated with women's traditional roles (religion, household, community) and reactions against new leftist women's positions
- 4. Dalton et al cite two possible models of party-system change:
 - a. The "social cleavage model" says that parties may realign to reflect changing social cleavages. Constraints: ideological orientations, organizational style, openness of electoral system, party financing. They find party system fragmentation is most important. Possible outcomes: established party takes over new issue, new party emerges, elites resist issues till they dissipate, issues become valence issues and all parties support them.
 - b. The "functional model" says declining relevance of parties to political action leads to dealignment. Several forms: parties become ideologically more heterogeneous (as

in U.S.), single-issue parties proliferate, referenda increase, citizen action and single-issue groups bypass parties.

- c. The two models are complementary. Rise of New Politics signifies a shift from social-group to issue-group cleavages: latter don't institutionalize as well. Mobilization along new group lines (e.g. regional) also fragments and destabilizes politics.

State and Economy

A. Capitalism and Democracy

1. The Marxist tradition: capitalists control the state
 - a. Conspiracy versions
 - b. Systems versions
2. The Weberian tradition: Schumpeter
 - a. elite theory of democracy
 - b. No necessary control by capitalists of the state
3. T. H. Marshall's sequential theory of citizenship
 - a. Civil
 - b. Political
 - c. Social
 - d. Relation to SSRC Crises and Sequences model
4. The Power-Elite tradition and American Populism: often a Pluralist approach
 - a. The Military-Industrial Complex
 - b. C. Wright Mills
 - c. Dahl
 - d. The New Left
 - e. Lindblom
5. The Neo-Conservatives
 - a. No democracy without capitalism
 - b. Need for traditional values
 - c. Critique: capitalism undermines traditional values

B. The Welfare State

1. Conservative beginnings with Disraeli and Bismarck
 - a. The “two nations” and the national community
 - b. Attempts to head off working-class radicalism
 - 1) NB that most socialist parties subsequently incorporated welfare-state measures into their programs
 - c. Attempts to save capitalism or overcome it?
2. The Pluralist view of the American State
 - a. Roosevelt, the New Deal, and American liberalism
 - 1) Comparisons with fascism: top-down control (Marxist and Weberian critiques)
 - 2) Resistance to Populist pressures: Huey Long, Father Coughlin, Reverend Townsend
 - b. Government responsiveness to constituencies: institutionalizing the capacity to govern (Huntington)
 - c. Interest groups and regulatory agencies: the question of cooptation
 - d. Bureaucratic cultures
3. Neo-Marxist interpretations of the Welfare State
 - a. Systems Perspective: the State must provide Capital with infrastructure
 - b. O’Connor on Accumulation/Fiscal Crisis Tendencies
 - c. Habermas on Legitimation Crisis Tendencies
 - d. Przeworski: The Social Democratic Welfare State as a class compromise, providing the working class with a stake in capitalism

C. The Weberian perspective on the State and Capitalism

1. Elite theorists: Weber, Michels, Mosca
 - a. Aron: a “ruling class” rather than a capitalist class
 - b. Dahrendorf: conflict over authority (political) relations, not class struggle
 - c. Some similarity to theories of hegemony
2. Corporatism. Andrew Shonfield: State planning (state centralization as a variable)
 - a. A theory of neo-mercantilism which speaks of the influence of elites in the state and the economy.
 - b. Describes centralized states best, like dirigist France.
 - c. Decentralized states like the U.S. don't fit as well. Describes the American state as “riotous pluralism” (1965, p. 323).
3. Neo-Corporatism: Tripartite panels
 - a. Compare to Consociationalism [Lijphart]
 - b. Philippe Schmitter
 - 1) Types
 - a) Societal Corporatism: liberal, initiated by society
 - b) State Corporatism: authoritarian, initiated by the State
 - 2) Ability of Neo-corporatism to handle higher levels of conflict, and thus overcome legitimization problems
 - c. Liberal/pluralist critiques
 - 1) Neo-corporatism creates legitimization problems because it displaces representative functions from Parliamentary bodies to tripartite panels.

- 2) Neo-corporatism generates inflation by driving up rates for the most protected sectors (esp. big business, big labor) at the expense of unrepresented sectors (esp. people on fixed income like pensioners or people on welfare). This contributes to legitimation problems.
 - d. Marxist critiques. Neo-corporatism is simply another method by which capitalists control the working classes by coopting them in tripartite panels. The state serves the interests of the capitalist class.
 - e. Neo-Weberian critiques.
 - 1) Neo-corporatism has no existence independent of State and party elites: it is encapsulated by the latter and exists at their convenience.
 - 2) Neo-corporatism is simply a method for helping small countries compete in international markets. All sectors pull together and all benefit.
 - 3) Neo-corporatism cannot survive inflationary periods.
- D. Harold Wilensky's Account (*Rich Democracies*, 2002)
1. Convergence theory: baseline similarities of rich democracies [ch. 1]
 - a. Basically the same as development theory or functionalism: increased affluence, education, meritocracy, mobility/communication, etc.
 2. Distinction among main types of political economy [ch. 2]
 - a. Democratic Corporatist: Tripartite panels, etc (S, N, FK, IL, DK, NL, B, A, I, D)
 - b. Corporatist without Labor (F, J)
 - c. Decentralized (GB, USA, NZ, AUS, CN, IR)
 - d. Main causes of corporatism -
 - 1) PR
 - 2) Left and Catholic movements
 - 3) Trade/globalism not a cause but a consequence of corporatism
 3. Participation theory [ch. 3, 4, 11]
 - a. Stronger in corporatism. Parties stronger.

- b. Weaker in decentralized societies: Mass Society. Parties have declined (Dealignment) most in these countries [US, UK, CN, NZ, AUS, DK]. Also corresponds to a more influential and more cynical mass media.

4. Social Spending & Welfare State

- a. Main causes [ch. 5]
 - 1) Affluence plus demographic change: aging
 - 2) Late industrialization
 - a) Early industrializers/democratizers valued free markets too much
 - b) Late industrializers/democratizers worried about heading off socialism
 - 3) Corporatism
- b. No evidence that high social spending is a drag on growth. Rather, high social spending combined with corporatism contributed to growth prior to the oil shocks of the 1970s because they led to labor peace. [ch. 12]
- c. Little evidence that globalization impedes growth. [ch. 17]
 - 1) Foreign trade and migration are not especially high by historical standards.
 - 2) Corporatist arrangements may shield countries from external shocks like globalization (or oil shocks)
 - 3) Globalization may harm lagging sectors, which are vulnerable anyway.
 - 4) Central banks following Milton Friedman doctrines may harm corporatist arrangements, which may harm growth.
- d. Tax-Welfare Backlash [ch. 10] - only happens in 2 main instances:
 - 1) When the taxes are very visible: income & property taxes cause backlash; consumption (sales) & payroll taxes don't

- 2) Spending only creates backlash when targeted to poor, means-tested populations, not when they are universal & targeted to majority of the population
 - a) Note bigotry/xenophobia, when benefits tied to minorities (affirmative action)
5. American Exceptionalism is mainly just a case of the U.S. being the most extreme non-corporatist case
 - a. Other British-descended countries are similar (UK, CAN, AUS, NZ)
 - b. Decentralized, mass society
 - c. Early democratizers, thus, low democratic corporatism
 - d. Low democratic corporatism results in:
 - 1) High tax-welfare backlash and populist politics (this also due to very visible tax forms and programs targeted at minorities (incl affirmative action))
 - 2) High party-system dealignment, low political participation, low civil society
 - 3) High mass media dominance, cynicism, sensationalism
 - 4) High legalistic conflict resolution
 - e. But on the whole, the U.S. does not differ from other rich democracies so radically
 - f. Unlikely to build corporatism in America, but it is possible to reduce visibility of revenue-collection and affirmative action programs targeted at ascriptive populations
 - 1) Left objections to regressive revenue streams (esp sales tax) should be overcome for the sake of higher revenues that can be used for progressive social programs
 - 2) Left support for affirmative action should be dropped for the sake of building more inclusive programs that will also permit broader political coalition-building, with the inclusion of the middle mass (upper working class & lower middle class), which is otherwise drawn to populist backlash

Political Participation

A. Tocqueville and Mill on the Relation between Participation and Democracy

1. Tocqueville on Liberty and Despotism

- a. Local self determination vs. centralization (NB cases)
- b. Institutions: township, religion, jury, parties
- c. Mores: habits, practices, orientations
- d. Tyranny of the majority and Democratic despotism
 - 1) Fluid majorities vs. ascriptive majorities
 - 2) Problems of transition and self-reinforcement

2. Mill on political learning

- a. The working class, women and the franchise
- b. Liberty, learning, and self-restraint

B. Verba and Nie's Four types of "conventional" participation

1. Voting
2. Campaign activity
3. Communal activity
4. Contacting officials on personal matters

C. Verba and Nie's determinants of "conventional" participation

1. Social status (socioeconomic resources)
 - a. Upper status people participate more
 - b. Republicans generally participate more than democrats
 - c. cf. Marxist explanations based on economic power

2. Countervailing ethnic factors
 - a. Blacks in America participate much more than their SES would predict.
 - b. Verba and Nie account for this as a result of group consciousness - analogous to working class consciousness.
 3. Countervailing organizational factors
 - a. Working-class organizations. Verba and Nie's cross-national studies show that the SES-participation correlation is weakened when working-class parties and unions raise participation levels among lower-status people.
 4. Social-psychological factors deriving from a liberal democratic political culture. These return to Tocqueville
 - a. Efficacy
 - b. Trust
 - c. Sense of involvement
 5. Other factors cited in research
 - a. Life-cycle factors
 - b. Gender (cf. status, efficacy, etc.)
 - c. Party ID
- D. Other factors cited in research on voter turnout
1. Institutional factors
 - a. Extension of franchise
 - b. Automatic registration
 - c. Legal requirements to vote
 - d. Holding elections on Sundays or convenient times
 - e. Proportional representation
 - f. Concentration of elections (vs. America, where the dog-catcher is up for election)
 - g. Referenda, etc.

2. Political factors

a. Sharp or close competition

- 1) Ideological mobilization and true party choice: related to PR
- 2) Bland parties in America are said to create political alienation; but turnout was not strongly reversed in the ideological Reagan elections

b. Sense of civic responsibility

c. Close races: rational choice reasons (the Gary Becker factor)

d. Impression of being on the winning side: the Harold Washington phenomenon

3. Voter turnout is comparatively low in America, but other forms of participation are comparatively high

E. Growing citizen sophistication and the growth of “unconventional” participation

1. I will talk mainly about the protest of the 1960s-70s here. I will talk more generally about protest and revolution in Week 11.

2. Barnes and Kaase study. Dissatisfaction with Almond/Verba and Verba/Nie studies in explaining 60s-70s protest.

a. Additional measures

- 1) Protest
- 2) Demonstrations
- 3) Strikes
- 4) Occupation and blockades
- 5) Destruction of property
- 6) Harm to people

b. Note that much protest went along with high levels of civic culture and support for democracy

- c. Different style of democratic support: participatory democracy vs. representative democracy
3. Two predictors of protest (see Dalton)
- a. Deprivation: corresponds more to lower status, disorganized protest
 - 1) Not as strongly connected to 60s/70s protest
 - b. Resource mobilization: corresponds to higher status or organized protest
 - 1) examples of latter: unions, ethnic organizations
 - 2) More typical of 60s/70s protest
 - 3) Connected to creation of issue publics. In fact, for many participants, voting participation went down at the same time that protest participation went up. It was simply a shift to a different type of participation.
 - 4) In some cases (esp. Britain) protest was found to be related to the impatience of young elites who felt excluded from decision-making participation. They wanted to be included.
4. My research on Civic Engagement in post-Katrina New Orleans
- a. Civic engagement increased due to the disaster (“Rise of Community Organizations, Citizen Engagement, and New Institutions”)
 - b. Neighborhood & community groups
 - 1) NB Ethnic groups & Social Aid & Pleasure Clubs
 - c. Strategies for recovery: the role of organizing
 - 1) Autonomous organization: block captains, data gathering
 - 2) Critical Mass & Tipping: building momentum & PR
 - 3) Cooperation & Umbrella Groups
 - 4) “Outside-Inside” organization

- d. Strategies in action: Blight reduction (“Can Citizens Affect Urban Policy? Blight Reduction”)
 - 1) The 2-prong Beacon of Hope strategy. Data gathering, plus:
 - a) Offers of help
 - b) Enforcement, incl appearing at hearings
 - 2) Limitations of this strategy in certain neighborhoods:
 - a) Landlords who won’t cooperate
 - b) Homeowners in lower-income areas (incl middle class) who can’t afford to repair
 - c) Market limitations on the demand side, i.e., insufficient return of population to attract people who would improve properties
 - 3) Findings from LSU Disaster Recovery Survey & LSU-NPN Neighborhood Leader Survey
 - a) Civic engagement helped
 - b) Civic organizations helped
 - c) Note how individual engagement was channeled through civic organizations
 - d) Question: to what extent was this simply in the private realm, & to what extent did it affect government policy?

Legitimation and Alienation I: "Sources and Structure"

A. A crisis?

1. 1960s protest and 1970s economic problems
2. New-Left and Neo-Conservative crisis theories
 - a. Legitimation crisis
 - b. Crisis of confidence
 - c. Government overload
 - d. Breakdown of "governability"

B. Theories of Political Support

1. Schumpeter's theory of "loads" and "balance"
 - a. New-Left versions
 - b. Neo-Conservative versions
 - c. Muddy middle versions
2. Types of Political Support
 - a. Easton's distinctions
 - 1) Diffuse system support
 - 2) Specific evaluation of state outputs or performance
 - b. Empirical investigations
 - 1) Miller: declining support
 - 2) Citrin's critique based on Easton
 - 3) Others: Kaase, Barnes & Kaase, Abramson
 - 4) Lipset and Schneider's summation
 - 5) Lehman's conclusion

3. Sources of Political Support

a. State Performance

- 1) Economic
- 2) Civil (Dis-)Order

b. Structure of Opposition

1) Party-System Factors

- a) Polarization
- b) Fragmentation
- c) Volatility

2) Governing Coalition Factors

- a) Consociationalism
- b) Oversized and Minority cabinets
- c) Cabinet stability

3) Neo-Corporatist Factors

C. My Model

D. My Results

Legitimation and Alienation II: "Political Culture & Political Structure"

A. A Social Action Framework

1. A Weberian approach
2. Contrast: Functionalism, Institutionalism, Rational Choice

B. Problems with traditional Positional Choice theories

1. Definition: Actor-Vectors
2. Liberal Democracy is not a first-order choice: actors would rather win
3. Liberal Democracy is a second-order choice: a method for insuring against losses
4. Even the best positional-choice analyses implicitly agree with my critique. Moore, Therborn, Luebbert, Stephens all speak of actor alliances or interactions.
5. Thus, positional choice arguments necessary for explaining actors' pursuit of first-order goals, but insufficient for explaining a liberal democratic outcome. We need theories of interaction to explain the latter.

C. System Statics: Political Structure Constrained by Political Culture

1. Political Parties as examples of Social Actors. Perhaps extendable to interest groups or neo-corporatist institutions as well.
2. Party system Fractionalization
3. Party system Polarization
4. Party system Volatility
5. Coalition Forms
 - a. Coalition instability could lead to regime instability (not supported by evidence)
 - b. Consociationalism has an indeterminate effect

- c. Blocked alternance. Polarization only harms democracy when an extremist party has veto (or pivotal) power, the ability to prevent a wished-for change in administration.
 - 1) Proof in recent French and Italian history
 - 6. Two Examples of System-Statics (see paper)
 - a. Liberal Democracy in Germany
 - b. Contemporary Racialist Politics
- D. System Statics: Political Structure's Effect on Political Culture
- 1. The Relative Autonomy of Political Culture: Reasons why political structure may not affect political culture
 - a. A cultural substratum in language, socialization, mores
 - b. Dormant or latent values that can be revived
 - c. Culturally-shaped expectations that affect instrumental rationality
 - 2. The Direct Effect of Opposition Structure
 - a. The longer a liberal democracy is in place and functions well, the more citizens will learn to support it
 - 3. Comparative Preferences
 - a. Citizens will support a liberal democracy if it is preferable to a previous regime in their country
 - b. Citizens will support a liberal democracy if it exists in another country and appears to be preferable to the present regime in their own country
 - 4. Socialization Factors
 - a. Population does not tend to vary in their support for liberal democracy according to interests (first order preferences). Thus, class, party support, etc., do not have large effects.

- b. Population varies according to socialization factors like cohort, education, family structure.

- 1) But these factors vary according to direct effects and comparative preferences.

E. System Dynamics

1. Historical platforms: Culture-Structure Interactions

- a. Asymmetrical development

- b. Uneven development and lags

2. Sequencing: some more favorable than others (see paper)

3. Phasing and Non-phasing of Cycles (see paper)

4. Feedback Loops: Vicious and Virtuous Circles

- a. Political Culture and Political Structure can reinforce each other

- b. If democracy “works,” citizens vote for loyal opposition, and democracy continues to “work”

- c. If democracy does not “work,” citizens vote for extremist or anti-system opposition, and democracy breaks down

5. “Leveraging” Effects: Tipping, Strategic Cooperation, and Wedges

- a. Destructive form. Extremist opposition must:

- 1) Obtain veto power (pivotal position)
- 2) Block alternance
- 3) Tempt pro-system parties themselves to abandon support for legitimacy of liberal democracy

- b. Then destructive cycle sets in

Protest and Revolution

A. Social Psychological Theories

1. Tocqueville, James Davies
 - a. Relative deprivation and reference groups
 - b. Rising expectations (J-curve) and frustration-aggression
2. Empirical evidence for these theories may be weak
 - a. Civil rights movement and growth of black middle class? (William Julius Wilson)

B. Organizational Theories

1. Resource Mobilization
 - a. Grievances always present in societies
 - b. Should focus on organization, not grievances
 - c. Organizations challenge reigning authorities
 - d. Success of organizations depends on their ability to mobilize resources
2. Lenin
3. Gamson
4. McCarthy and Zald
5. Oberschall
6. Tilly

C. Structural Theories

1. Skocpol
 - a. Structural, objective conditions, not psychology of actors
 - 1) NB peasantry
 - b. International conditions: especially War
 - 1) If they weaken State: especially by weakening its fiscal basis

- c. Autonomy of the State
- 2. Smelser: Parsonsian approach
 - a. Orum's summary
 - 1) Structural conduciveness
 - 2) Strain
 - 3) Generalized belief
 - 4) Precipitating factors
 - 5) Mobilization for action
 - 6) Agents of social control
 - b. Smelser's work on the Industrial Revolution
 - 1) Differentiation
 - 2) Problems of integration
 - 3) Protest
 - 4) Resistance of est. authorities
 - 5) Handling and channeling
 - 6) Reintegration
- 3. Hofstadter, Lipset: Weberian approach
 - a. Status politics and status insecurity

D. Diagram of competing/complementary theories

Takes into account

Theory

Grievances

(incl. structure of grievances: relative deprivation, rising expectations)

Resources


(incl. organizational resources)

Opposition to Movement

Considers structure of opportunity for protest

Exogenous Factors

(incl. those that affect established actors and opposition movement: e.g., foreign relations)



Industrialism and Working-Class Politics I: The Marxist Problematic

- A. Marx's orthodox view in the Communist Manifesto and Capital
- B. Marx's theory of Bonapartism
- C. Modifications due to absence of revolutionary action
 - 1. Class consciousness (Lukacs)
 - 2. Hegemony (Gramsci)
- D. E. P. Thompson's historicist arguments
 - 1. one of the most important historical investigations in the Marxist tradition
 - 2. Class not a structure or category, but a process and set of social relations (pp. 9f)
 - a. Problem: this collapses Marx's original prediction (that economic conditions would lead to political consciousness and action) by making political elements (consciousness and action) part of the definition of class.
 - 3. Exploitation
 - a. Not just an economic process (standard of living, factory conditions)
 - b. Destruction of a way of life (p. 204)
 - 4. Former artisans (in the upper levels of the working class) were thus often the first to organize and protest
 - 5. Dual aspect of Methodism (p. 354, 388-9)
- E. Katznelson's revision of Thompson
 - 1. one of the best current analyses in the Marxist tradition

2. Four structural/historical elements to a class analysis
 - a. Structure
 - 1) Class categorization according to relations to means of production
 - b. Ways of Life
 - 1) Economic lifestyles shaped by class position
 - 2) NB: the first two are elements of economic classification
 - c. Dispositions
 - 1) Forms of consciousness (though not necessarily class consciousness): "Plausible and meaningful responses to the circumstances workers find themselves in." (p. 19)
 - d. Collective Action
 - 1) May or may not proceed along class lines
 - 2) Other factors may interfere
 - 3) NB: the last two are elements of politics: consciousness and action
3. Causal ties among these four levels are contingent
 - a. Implicit critique of Thompson by re-separating analytical elements, especially into economic and political
 - b. Problem: by noting that the ties that Marx predicted were generally not strong, Katznelson's would-be Marxist analysis shows that a Marxist analysis is not very effective.

Industrialism and Working-Class Politics II: Non-Marxist Approaches

F. Lipset, "Reformism and Radicalism"

G. Zolberg, "How Many Exceptionalisms?" - critique of Lipset

1. Claims Lipset forgot the effect of the Russian Revolution

- a. This simply split an inherent tension in the labor movement between reformism and revolutionary orientation
- b. Both were present the whole time, but organizationally unified. Now they were organizationally split.
- c. The organizational split (i.e., the existence of an independent communist party) cannot be taken as an indicator of a single dimension of "radicalism."

Nazism in Germany

A. Marxist Explanations

1. Classical - and to a lesser extent, revisionist - Marxism has had great trouble explaining Nazism for a number of reasons, including the following.
 - a. The bourgeoisie seems to have given up or lost control of the state without a proletarian revolution. At the least, this seems to demonstrate a problematical autonomy of the political realm; at worst, a contradiction of orthodox Marxist assertions.
 - b. A mass-based revolutionary movement arose which was not based on the working class.
 - c. The (posited) middle-class mass base of Nazi support undermines Marx's prediction of class polarization and the disappearance of the middle classes under capitalism.
2. Much more could be explained if one relaxed Marx's dictums about class polarization. But it is unclear whether a class-based explanation using a number of classes remains Marxist.
 - a. Geiger's analysis can be traced to the "revisionist" debates within the Marxist German Social Democratic Party around the turn of the century.
 - b. Once a multi-class framework is accepted, rich psychologically informed accounts are possible; for instance -
 - 1) resentment
 - 2) authoritarianism
 - 3) asynchronism
 - 4) These are related to Parsons' and Neumann's theories (more later)
3. Major Marxist theories applied to Nazism (see Ayçoberry)
 - a. The Theory of Agents
 - 1) The bourgeoisie used the Nazis as tools.

b. The Theory of Bonapartism

- 1) The bourgeoisie handed over political power to the Nazis in order to keep control of society.

c. The Theory of the Shrinking Social Base

- 1) The middle classes played the role of sorcerer's apprentice, first creating fascism before becoming its victim.

B. Functionalist Explanations

1. Parsons

- a. Authoritarian social structure
- b. Anomie, aggression, and hostility to target groups

2. Franz Neumann

- a. Authoritarian family structure
- b. Lower-middle class crisis

3. Dahrendorf and Lipset

- a. Modernization and protest of those by-passed
- b. Theory of status anxiety

4. Critiques from a Marxist point of view

- a. Is not "modernization" simply a part of economic development, not a question of value change?
- b. The class theory is central

C. "Structural"/Weberian Accounts

1. Lepsius

a. Political Culture

- 1) Democratic
- 2) Authoritarian
- 3) Communist

b. Party System

- 1) Incorporated the political culture
- 2) Inherited from the Second Empire
- 3) Structural/Coalitional deficiencies (Diagram, p. 43)

c. Economic Problems put pressure on weakened democratic culture/structure

d. Nazi Party and Hitler

- 1) Weber's theory of charisma
- 2) Hitler's double strategy: "the promise of legality and the threat of civil war" (p. 68). Amounted to withholding or delivering disorder: regime would be doomed in either case.

2. My formalization of this account

a. Party-system factors

- 1) Polarization
- 2) Coalition blockage
- 3) Veto power

b. Sequential/Cyclical factors

- 1) Political cultural heritage
- 2) Structural weaknesses in party/coalition system
- 3) Advent of economic crisis

- c. Dynamics of change
 - 1) Vicious/virtuous circles
 - 2) How change can be leveraged
 - a) Tipping
 - b) Strategic cooperation
 - c) Destructive leveraging

Party Realignment in America:
An Outline

A. New Deal alignment after WWII

1. Democrats

a. Social composition

- 1) Urban
- 2) Working-class & Unions
- 3) Ethnic/immigrant (pre-1920 groups)
- 4) Catholic
- 5) Jewish
- 6) Some attraction of Blacks

b. Southern conservative, segregationist (unchanged since Reconstruction)

- 1) However much the party might have wanted to promote black rights, the Southern component of the party made this difficult or impossible

c. Cold War Internationalist

- 1) Non-isolationist, esp in contrast to trad GOP isolationism
- 2) Anti-communist, esp in response to strong GOP anti-communism

d. New Deal (& after) Welfare State provisions, esp

- 1) Social Security, Unemployment Insurance, & various other benefits/entitlements to the middle- & working class & poor
- 2) Mild Govt intervention in the economy

2. Republicans

a. Social composition

- 1) Small-town & (sometimes) rural
- 2) White Anglo-Saxon Protestant
- 3) Middle class

- 4) "Main Street" & "Wall Street"
 - b. Non-Southern
 - c. Anti-Communist
 - 1) Remaining struggle over Isolationism vs. Internationalism
 - d. Mainly free-market, though some acceptance of post-New Deal Welfare State
3. This alignment produced
 - a. Strong Democratic Congressional majorities, with a few exceptions
 - b. Strong Democratic party ID majorities
 - c. An underlying Democratic Presidential majority, which the Republicans were effectively able to challenge when:
 - 1) Truman was weak at the wrong time of an election cycle
 - 2) They nominated a non-partisan war hero, Eisenhower
- B. The 1960s
1. By the early 60s, the New Deal alignment had begun to weaken in some respects
 - a. Republicans (esp. Eisenhower, Nixon, Rockefeller) had accepted, or at least ceased contesting, many of the entitlement programs - esp. for the middle class, but also for the poor
 - b. After Brown vs. the Board of Education, Eisenhower began tentatively to support black civil rights, while the Democrats still hung back because of their Southern wing
 - c. Democrats became increasingly cold-war anti-communist, in part as a response to the Republicans
 2. During the 1960-64 Presidential term, the Democrats moved to strong support of the Civil Rights movement
 - a. This was still somewhat tentative under Kennedy, but after his assassination, Johnson was key in pushing the civil rights legislation through Congress

- b. This won them full support from African Americans, who moved from plurality support for the Dems to almost unanimous support
- c. It began to undermine white Southern support, beginning with Presidential elections, and eventually continuing through Congressional, Gubernatorial, state and local politics
 - 1) The early stages of this realignment can perhaps be attributed to racial politics, but the later stages perhaps not
- 3. Also, under Kennedy-Johnson, the U.S. became much more heavily involved in the Vietnam War, and this began to produce tensions within the Democratic Party on foreign policy, and led to the emergence of an anti-war New Left
 - a. The anti-Cold War old left was now reinforced by new generations of anti-War New Left, who also had a personal stake because of the draft
 - b. The New Left was also inspired by the Civil Rights movement
- 4. In the course of the 60s, the New Left also became a Counter-Culture: generally anti-authoritarian, anti-Establishment, and anti-traditional morality.
 - a. It was predicated on affluence, and centered on the young, white, non-Southern well-educated middle class
 - b. It stressed individual self-fulfillment, sexual freedom, greater gender equality, freedom of expression, drug experimentation, non-traditional spiritualism, non-traditional family and community arrangements.
 - c. It rejected traditional religious, family, and community authority.
 - d. It was comparatively indifferent to the Old Left's focus on working-class and labor issues.
- 5. The impact of these developments was not yet strongly felt in the 1964 elections, but '64 saw the beginnings of certain political patterns that eventually became extremely important.
 - a. After the Civil Rights legislation, Johnson's landslide was possible only because he was a Southerner himself.

- 1) The Civil Rights legislation initiated the breakup of the Southern Democratic alignment, and no non-Southern Democratic presidential candidate since Kennedy has done well in the South - and therefore in the electoral college.
 - 2) Johnson was also probably the last Democratic Presidential candidate who could draw fully on the old New Deal non-Southern urban working-class support. After '64, this constituency began to fragment.
- b. Johnson also did well because Goldwater rejected the moderate Republican accommodation of the New Deal welfare state and of the Democrats' lukewarm support for Cold War anti-communism. Goldwater lost because he was seen as too extreme. However, he planted two seeds that came to fruition under Reagan:
- 1) A stress on libertarian free-market economics and principled opposition to welfare state measures
 - 2) A reinvigorated Cold-War anti-communism that was not a return to older Republican isolationism
 - 3) He did not take a strong anti-Civil Rights stand, nor did he stress social and cultural conservatism. His legacy on these issues was less pronounced.
6. The 1968 and 1972 elections saw the full impact of the issues of Race, the Vietnam War, and counterculture. A major anti-liberal reaction began to set in, first picked up by George Wallace, and then absorbed by Nixon.
- a. The segregationist South reacted against civil rights legislation, and first supported a segregationist Democrat like Wallace. But Wallace broadened his appeal by also stressing -
- 1) Opposition to Federal programs and government bureaucracy
 - 2) Patriotic support for the American war effort in Vietnam
 - 3) Opposition to countercultural values and New Left elitism
- b. Wallace's package began to draw broader support than just Southern segregationists:
- 1) The non-Southern working class, especially in the industrial Midwest and North Atlantic states

- 2) Traditional moralists, now not just conservative Protestants, but increasingly, conservative Catholics, too.
 - 3) Cold-War anti-communist patriotic non-isolationists.
- c. Wallace helped split the Democratic vote in 1968, but Nixon adopted much of his position, though with reduced intensity. All these factors, including Nixon's "Southern Strategy," helped put an end to the long New Deal Democratic dominance of the Presidency.
 - d. Out of office after 1968, the New Left's influence grew in the Democratic Party, and it captured the nomination in 1972. Nixon was able to reinforce the support of the South and anti-New Left constituencies, retain traditional conservative support, and simultaneously move to the center - and won in a landslide.
 - e. The scandals of Watergate interrupted this Republican dominance of Presidential elections, but that proved temporary.
- C. Political disaffection, beginning in the 1960s.
1. In the mid-1960s, political disaffection and alienation began to set in, accompanied by declining electoral turnout. This trend has fluctuated a few times, but has never since been decisively reversed.
 2. Disaffection was first expressed by the 60s protest movements, especially the Civil Rights and New Left movement. However, even as they expressed disaffection, they also captured the Democratic Party.
 3. Disaffection was then expressed by the reaction against these movements under Wallace and Nixon.
 4. Spurred on by the tenor of these protest movements, disaffection was increasingly directed against all established social and political institutions, and parties. And this cynicism was tremendously reinforced by the scandals of Watergate.
 5. More generally, analysts speak of a period of political de-alignment, rather than realignment during this time.

- a. The improbable but successful New Deal coalition of Northern liberals and minorities with Southern conservatives began to break apart.
- b. But more than this, voters stopped taking cues from their own political leadership to the extent that they used to.
 - 1) Traditional church, union, ethnic and communal leaders began to lose influence over their members. More voters began to make their choices as individuals, without leadership cues.
 - a) African Americans are a partial exception to this rule. Black leaders retain more influence than in most other social groups, but even they have trouble leading the poorest and most alienated blacks.
- c. Voting became increasingly influenced, not by traditional leaders and alignments, but by new single-issue social movements, by candidates' personalities, and by scandals and corruption.
 - 1) Even the influence of social movements began to wane, as they moved to direct mail and television rather than social mobilization to attract support. The result was even less influence of organization and even more social and political privatization.
6. As the parties lost their ability to integrate constituencies in broad, stable coalitions, all groups began to feel more neglected and disadvantaged. Political disaffection with parties and government grew.
7. Again, this disaffection was not simply due to unpopular policies. A great number of individual policies were actually very popular. Nor was it simply due to the unpopularity of individual politicians - on the contrary, surveys often show strong respondent support for their own representatives. Rather, disaffection was due to the decreased integrative capacity of parties and leaders, and government and social institutions.
8. Some politicians, notably Reagan and Clinton, have been able to reduce this disaffection temporarily, but not reverse the major trend.

D. The 1970s - 1980s.

1. After Watergate, the Democrats made large gains in the 1974 congressional elections, and revived the New Deal coalition sufficiently to elect Jimmy Carter, a Southerner, in 1976. But in terms of Presidential politics, this was a temporary aberration.
2. Several important socioeconomic developments began to change the terms of politics.
 - a. The long post WWII economic expansion slowed tremendously with the oil shocks, recessions, inflation, and deficits of the 70s and 80s. People spoke of fiscal crises and crises of governability.
 - b. At the same time, de-industrialization gained speed. Manufacturing moved increasingly offshore, and despite a weaker economy, a post-industrial economy and society grew.
 - c. The economic squeeze and movement to service economy was accompanied by a greater feminization of the workforce. And as women moved increasingly into the labor force, the women's movement gained force.
 - 1) Although women's pay has trended toward equality, it was substantially less than men's, especially early in this period.
 - 2) The women's movement also put questions of divorce, abortion, and single-parenthood more squarely into the public debate.
 - d. Social conservatives began to counter-mobilize on the social questions raised by the women's movement, and Christian fundamentalism became a major political force.
 - e. Again, movement organization on both the left and the right was more privatized and less socially mobilized, using direct mail and media, than the civil rights and anti-war movements had been.
 - f. Overt racism became less politically relevant.
 - 1) On one hand, racial attitudes in the South began converging with the rest of the nation. On the other hand, issues moved from denial of civil rights and segregation to questions of busing and affirmative action - in all parts of the country.

- 2) African Americans remained firmly in the Democratic column.
 - 3) Social conservatives reduced their emphasis on racial questions and turned instead to questions of traditional values, family, sexuality, and religion. The distance from the social conservatism of George Wallace to that of Ronald Reagan highlights this change.
- g. The Cold War reached a turning point with American withdrawal from Vietnam; and it ended with the collapse of the Soviet empire, having been given a big push by Reagan's defense spending.
3. The political consequences of these socioeconomic changes were these:
 - a. The South continued to move more firmly into the Republican camp, no longer so much because of racism, but because of Christian conservatism, conservative social values, and Cold War patriotism.
 - b. The organized working class continued to lose power and influence. Unionization declined in the weak economy and with de-industrialization. More families moved into white-collar occupations and thus, further from old New Deal partisan loyalties. Reagan in particular made great inroads into the working-class electorate, especially when they were socially conservative. Bush had less success, but aimed at a similar goal.
 - 1) The unions have subsequently regained some of their political influence - but more as a pressure group than as a mass-based organization.
 - c. A gender gap began to open up, not just in America, but in most western democracies, based partly on economic inequality, partly on social issues, and partly over defense issues. More on this later.
 - d. These changes tended to work to the Republicans' advantage, not only in Presidential politics, but increasingly, in the Senate, and eventually in the House, too. However, there were certain consequences and limits of Reagan's and Bush's policies.
 - 1) Reagan and Bush both gave strong symbolic lip-service to the social issues, but refrained from pushing much policy - except, to some extent, in court appointments.

- 2) They greatly increased defense spending, but without reducing social spending much. They also oversaw important tax reductions. The result was victory in the Cold War, and a huge increase in government deficits.
 - 3) The Republicans - and Thatcher in Britain - also put tremendous emphasis on marketization. Government services were privatized, markets were encouraged, and unions discouraged. This trend later gained force with the collapse of Communism.
- e. Republican policy had several important consequences
- 1) It ended the Cold War. Republican credit for this was short-lived because it also removed one of their most effective issues: anti-communism.
 - a) Center-right parties all over the world actually lost influence because of this victory, and some parties like the Italian Christian Democrats actually went out of existence, when voters were no longer willing to overlook corruption for the sake of anti-communism.
 - b) Center-left parties all over the world had to scramble in the 90s to develop "third ways." In the U.S., this would open opportunities for "New Democrats" like Clinton. By the mid-90s, "third way" center-left parties governed most western democracies.
 - 2) It greatly increased government deficits, and opened a new axis of economic debate.
 - a) Reagan's Republicans had hoped to use tax cuts to force reductions in government spending. Yet while voters were opposed to "big government" in the abstract, they strongly supported almost every government program. On concrete issue after concrete issue, Republicans found very little support for spending reductions, and the deficit resulted.
 - b) Republicans were now divided on policy. On one side were economic populists, who wanted tax reduction, fewer government services, and more marketization. And on the other side were fiscal conservatives, who wanted to balance the budget.
 - c) This policy split reflected strains within the Republican coalition. Reagan's Republican party had put together a "big tent," which as Bill Schneider put it,

was composed of three parts: Wall Street, Main Street, and Easy Street. Wall Street and Main Street were the traditional Republican constituents, and they leaned toward fiscal conservatism. Easy Streeters were the Reagan Democrats, and they were the economic populists.

- d) The Democrats were initially left out of this debate. Republican tax reductions had stolen one of their traditionally popular New Deal strategies - pump-priming - and along with it, part of their appeal to white working-class voters.
- e) Deficits did, however, open the way for Ross Perot's third-party insurgency, focused on fiscal responsibility. Perot mainly harmed the Republicans, because he drew more from fiscal conservatives than Reagan Democrats.

3) Finally, social conservatism began to reach its political limits.

- a) Neither Reagan nor Bush ever delivered as much policy as lip service to the social conservatives. Reagan was personally so popular among social conservatives that they tended to forgive him for it, but Bush was always suspected of not being "one of us."
- b) As they failed to get much substance for their support, Christian conservatives, especially, began to re-think their commitment to political activity. (Some observers note that Evangelicals have historically tended to avoid party politics, and that the 1970s and 1980s were an aberration in this respect.) Also, after fielding two secular Northerners in the 80s (Mondale and Dukakis), the Democrats returned to Southern candidates in the 90s (Clinton, Gore), who could cut into Christian conservative support. As a result, Christian conservatives became less of an active force in favor of the Republicans.

E. Institutional factors that promoted polarization from the 1960s to the 1980s.

1. Some observers have speculated that the American public became more polarized from the 1960s to the 1980s, and that this accounted for polarization of the parties.
2. However, studies of public opinion, like Paul Dimaggio's AJS article, have indicated that there was not substantial polarization of public opinion, though political partisans polarized to some extent.

3. One reason for partisan polarization was the party primaries. Candidates had to appeal especially to activists, who voted more heavily in low-turnout primaries. This benefitted more extremist challengers through this period.
4. Another reason was the redistricting of Congressional seats in the wake of Civil Rights legislation.
 - a. As congressional districts were made more uniform in terms of race and class, the elected Representatives could take more extreme positions because they did not have to form coalitions of diverse constituencies.
 - b. Thus, House Representatives became more polarized than Senators or Governors, who had to be elected from more diverse state-wide constituencies, or than Presidential candidates, who had to put together national coalitions.
5. One consequence of partisan polarization was that now, not only “movement” voters, but even centrist voters began to feel disaffected.
 - a. In social terms, the parties were becoming defined by their more socially extreme constituencies. For the Democrats, these were activist blacks, feminists, environmentalists, gays and lesbians, and protectionists within the labor movement. For Republicans, these were Christian conservatives, anti-abortionists, and anti-government, anti-tax populists.
 - b. Thus, socially-centrist voters became as alienated as social movement voters had earlier felt. This eventually aided the Perot candidacy; and it helped Clinton, and later, George W. Bush move their parties back toward the center. The parties began increasingly to battle for the “Angry White Men,” “Soccer Moms,” and similar constituencies, who had once formed the center of American politics.
 - c. Of course, with a nation as diverse as the United States, and with an electoral system not based on proportional representation, it is always difficult to hold together coalitions within just two parties. Some groups will almost inevitably feel excluded. What is unusual is that by the end of the 1980s, it was the centrist constituencies who felt excluded.
6. Ultimately, party polarization changed the whole dynamic of party primaries and third party insurgencies. Earlier in this period, challengers to the party establishment generally came from the extremes. Examples include Goldwater, George Wallace, Bobby Kennedy, McCarthy, McGovern, and Reagan. By the end of this period - and

extending up to the present - insurgents came from the angry center. Perot is the biggest example, but others include John Anderson, Clinton, McCain, and Bradley. In fact, in this year's primaries, the party-establishment candidates had to move to the outside to beat centrist insurgents.

F. The 1990s.

1. In the 90s, the Democrats under Clinton clawed their way back toward the center, and the Republicans initially continued their movement to the populist, socially conservative right, but then found themselves overextended and forced to rethink their position.
2. In 1992, George Bush was punished by economic populists for going back on his "no new taxes" pledge; and he wasn't able to hold the fiscal conservatives in line against the Perot insurgency. He got very little help from the Western victory in the Cold War. The Gulf War boost was very short-lived.
3. At the same time, Bill Clinton signaled that he intended to pursue a fiscally conservative policy, and reign in the influence of new left "movement" politics, especially those who were farthest out in the black, counter-cultural, and women's movements. He no longer had a Cold War flank to protect.
 - a. After a political false start on a National Health Insurance policy, Clinton in office drew back from ambitious new social policies, and eventually even scaled back welfare benefits.
 - b. He gave Robert Rubin and Alan Greenspan the lead on fiscal responsibility. This resulted in an enormous economic expansion, which helped paper over any tensions that might have emerged within the Democratic coalition from a weak economy.
 - c. As a result of the expansion, fueled by the "New Economy," Clinton was also able to push through more market policies and promote international open markets against economic populists in his own party like Gephardt, and outside the party, like Buchanan.
 - d. Deficits disappeared, and the issue was removed from the political agenda - at least for the time being.
 - e. Clinton and the Democrats could now focus on maintaining and protecting social programs like social security, and pursue an incremental approach on health care, education, and anti-poverty programs.

4. After benefitting from Clinton's initial political missteps on a national health insurance and possibly gays in the military, the Republicans took control of the House for the first time in decades with their Contract With America in 1994.
 - a. However, they may have benefitted as much from low Democratic turnout as from real voter change.
 - b. The Republicans overestimated the popularity of their programs and underestimated Clinton's political skills. They overextended themselves, lost showdowns, and were punished at the polls in 1996 and even 1998.
 - c. Their impeachment campaign against Clinton struck very little popular resonance, and may even have produced a backlash against Republican moralistic "extremism." The public didn't approve of Clinton's private actions, but felt it wasn't an abuse of office. He was also shielded by a strong economy and high job-approval ratings - and, like Reagan, by his charm.

5. Coming into the 2000 election, George W. Bush signaled his intention - parallel to Clinton's in 1992 - to move his party back toward the center, with his "compassionate conservatism."
 - a. He hopes to downplay extreme social conservatism, without losing social conservative voters. Thus, he says as little as possible about issues like abortion or prayer in schools.
 - b. He hopes to steal, or at least cut into, some of the Democrats issues - as Clinton earlier stole the traditionally Republican issue of fiscal conservatism. Thus, Bush speaks of educational reform, and providing aid to the poor through "faith-based institutions."
 - c. He makes gestures toward minority voters.
 - 1) In the case of Hispanics, he actually hopes that this group may come into play. He has had success in wooing Hispanics in Texas, as has his brother Jeb in Florida. He appeals to middle-class Hispanics on economic policy, of course, but he also appeals on the basis of family and religious values, and cultural respect.
 - 2) He would also like to make inroads with Asians, along similar lines.

- 3) He doesn't have much immediate hope of winning over many African Americans, though he hopes the Republicans can eventually attract some support in the future - again, along the same lines.
 - 4) One of the biggest reasons for his outreach to minorities is to signal that he is socially tolerant, especially to middle class women - Soccer Moms. This is a low-cost way of showing social moderation, without driving off social conservatives by making concessions on anti-abortionism or religious fundamentalism.
- d. Bush had to divert his centrist drive to defeat McCain, the centrist challenger in the primaries, but he seems back on track, without having tarred himself too badly as an extremist Republican.

G. Beyond 2000.

1. Thus, both parties moved to certain extremes in the 1960s - 1980s period, as the New Deal alignments faded, in order to capture new constituencies.
2. As these realignments reached certain limits, and in a post-Cold War period of prosperity - with the really hard issues off the agenda for the moment - the parties are moving back toward the center to try to consolidate their re-constituted coalitions. Competition has returned to the sociological center, as well, as the parties attempt to capture/recapture cross-pressured middle-class white men and women voters, without alienating their more extreme true believers.
3. These centrist battlegrounds have opened at least by the 1990s -
 - a. Gender. Historically, the gender gap that opened in the 1970s can be caricatured as cowboys versus moms.
 - 1) White middle-class men (the cowboys) were attracted to individualist and macho themes like a strong defense, gun rights, law and order, lower taxes, and smaller government.
 - 2) White middle-class women (the moms) were attracted to "nurturance" issues like education and health care (because they were more often care-givers for young or old family members), maintaining government programs (because they were less economically secure), and perhaps also abortion rights and gun control - though the latter two divide the genders less than is sometimes thought.

- 3) Lake and Goeas have noted that a “marriage gap” has begun to open up in the same realm as the gender gap.
- b. Minorities and new immigrants.
 - 1) Most Hispanics favor the Democrats, while Asians are more evenly divided, but both groups’ loyalties are increasingly in play, and the Republicans are increasingly interested in them.
 - a) Republicans can appeal to them on economics as they enter the middle class, and on traditional family and religious values.
 - b) Of course Hispanics and Asians are also divided into many nationality groups, whose party preferences vary widely.
 - 2) Republicans also keep a watchful eye on African Americans, who are still almost monolithically Democratic, but who may eventually begin to divide their vote for the same reasons as the other minorities do now.
 - 3) Republicans can also signal their tolerance to white middle-class women by appealing to minorities.
 - c. The South. The Democrats have begun to win back some of their losses in the South. The situation has changed as racism moderates - or at least becomes less regionalized - as the parties move back toward the center, as the Southern economy booms and non-Southerners move in, and with the end of the Cold War. Pragmatic Democrats have made serious inroads on Republican ideologues, especially when they run on modernization, education, and health care. The South is becoming stably competitive for perhaps the first time since Reconstruction.
 - d. Social Class. Class voting has declined in all western democracies since WWII, and most of all in the U.S. It may rise again with future economic downturns, but it is unlikely to regain its old strength or its old form, as industrialism declines as a proportion of the American economy.
 - e. Social Conservatives, especially Christian conservatives. Since Nixon, social conservatives have generally supported Republicans, but this support has been tenuous for several reasons.

- 1) Republicans can easily give lip-service to traditional values, but it is dangerous for them to enact extreme policies like abortion restrictions or prayer in school, because they may lose centrist support. Thus, social conservatives have become more cynical about the Republicans and have lost some of their political fervor. And if Republicans like Reagan can offer them lip service, Southern Democrats, especially, can also sometimes talk their talk.
- 2) Social conservatives are often lower middle class or below, and are thus open to appeals by Democrats on economic issues. Pragmatic Democrats can often successfully appeal to them by offering to protect or reinforce popular government programs like social security, education, or health care.