# Tocqueville - Lecture 1

## A. Democracy vs. Freedom

- 1. Tocqueville concerned about the state of affairs in France (first half of 19th century): equality without freedom. Wrote mainly in this regard.
- 2. Attempted to steer a path between the radical rationalism of the philosophes and the conservatism of the "traditionalists" like Burke.
- 3. Originated the question of Tyranny of the Majority.
- 4. Democracy defined in terms of equality esp of conditions. Liberty defined in terms of political life esp certain forms of participation. Not defined "negatively," as with Hobbes, as freedom from external constraint.

#### B. Historical Development of Democracy in Europe

- 1. Kings were the main levelers: the rise of absolutism. Reduced all hierarchy and social differentiation under them (DIA 10f).
- 2. Causes of equalization: list on DIA 11f.
- 3. Progress of Democratization has become irresistable; Tocqueville views it with "religious" dread or awe (DIA 12f).
- 4. Democracy grew too fast and uncontrolledly: destroyed intermediate associations with destruction of aristocracy, and thereby structure of freedom. Men's passions for equality led them to ignore requisites of freedom (DIA 14ff).
- 5. Same is true of religion: men no longer see its value; it is set against freedom, whereas it is a component part of freedom (DIA 16f).

# C. Historical Development of Democracy in America

- 1. Origins of Liberal Democracy (The point of departure)
  - a. English immigrants brought germ of freedom with them; found conditions for equality (initial condition and limitless land) (DIA 32f).

- b. Puritanism: combined religion with democracy; was worldly and practical; and was socially homogeneous (DIA 36f). Spirit of religion and of democracy complementary: each stays in its own sphere; former creates values which limit excesses of latter (DIA 46f). (Compare to Hobbes's and Smith's views.)
- c. Puritan society engaged in moral self-regulation: two parts of liberal democracy (DIA 42ff). And America was organized from the bottom up from local level to national (DIA 44f).
- d. New England like a beacon of this civilization, as against southwest of Hudson (DIA 35f).
- e. NB comparative-historical account in Chap. 3. Laws of land inheritance prevented creation of great wealth, strengthened family. Created uniformity of ideas (values, culture), as against that of traditional aristocracy (DIA 50-7).
- 2. Conditions which maintain Liberal Democracy. NB comparative historical method and contrast to Montesquieu.
  - a. Accidental situation: limitless land, Puritan origins, double migration (DIA 278f).
  - b. Laws (DIA 286f).
  - c. Mores. Religion: sects and tolerance (DIA 290f); separation of church and state (DIA 295f) also helps temper their power (cf. Europe, DIA 312f). Also experience, intermediate bodies.

#### D. Structure of Freedom in America

- 1. NB description of tumultuous political life (DIA 242ff).
- 2. Township.
  - a. Township rooted in nature; local freedom natural but rare (DIA 62) (cf. DIA 674: "product of art"). Self-government, self-administration. Ties self-interest to public interest.
  - b. Distinction between centralized government and administration (DIA 87ff). Latter enervates political and socioeconomic life. But <u>political</u> advantages of decentralization are decisive: it permits liberty (NB, equated with political participation, activity, life) (DIA 93; 95).

- c. In Europe, citizen detached from his own fate: oscillates between servility and license: political order more brittle; such nations "ripe for conquest" (DIA 93f).
- d. Township system helps correct danger of atomization inherent in democracy: need for secondary associations (cf. Montesquieu, Durkheim). Democracy especially prone to administrative centralization over atomized individuals (DIA 96).
- 3. Parties and Political Associations (DIA 174f; 189f). NB question of minorities' ability to become majority when no great principles are involved in uniform society (DIA 193f).
- 4. Press (DIA 180f).
- 5. Juries and Lawyers
- 6. Religion
- E. Ideology and democracy: Parties and the Press in America and France
  - 1. Parties emerge from general differences among citizens: an evil inherent in democracy (DIA 174).
  - 2. Great parties vs. small parties: former attached to principles, especially that of democratization (DIA 174f). Even with small parties, differences based on class differences, but when these are fluid, as in America, they can become patronage machines and there can be party switching; NB no ethnic or religious based parties (DIA 177, 193f). [NB theories of consociational democracy; Duvergerian party competition for unimodal center.]
  - 3. Similar analysis with regard to the Press. Press is always destructive, but when it is based on principles and attached to principled parties, it is especially destructive. In America, it is fragmented and oriented toward petty problems it disperses its effects. No global opinions are printed; only facts (DIA 180-86).

# F. Tyranny of the majority

- 1. Created by social sameness and leveling. NB lack of freedom of spirit in America (DIA 254, 256).
- 2. NB description of mob rule (DIA 252, note).
- 3. NB distinction between govt and admin centralization (DIA 262).

- 4. What tempers tyranny of majority: lawyers (tastes of aristocrats: DIA 263f); juries (introduce practice of freedom: DIA 272f.
- G. Feudal society and the transition in Smith and Tocqueville (DIA 9-15)
  - 1. Agree: old source of power was land.
  - 2. Smith saw feudal Europe as chaotic and anarchic; Tocqueville saw it as a golden age.
  - 3. For Tocqueville, democratization began with following: (a) clergy open to all estates; (b) lawyers gained influence as society became more complicated; (c) power of money and trade grew; (d) enlightenment and education became more important and were open to more people; (e) nobility sometimes raised commoners in struggles with others, as did kings nobility could be bought; (f) citizens came to own land, have access to wealth and knowledge; (g) proximate causes of wars, municipal independence, post (mail), Protestantism, opening of America.
  - 4. Smith's account does not take many of the cultural elements into account (especially education and ideology).
  - 5. Tocqueville sees democratization in Europe as potentially leading to anarchy; Smith sees it as leading to order, freedom, and good government.
  - 6. For Smith, the old feudal network of social ties led merely to inefficiencies and irrationalities (e.g., guilds); for Tocqueville, breakup of these ties led to disorder, jealously of rank, (proto-)anomie.
- H. General character of liberal democracy extended from Tocqueville
  - 1. Agreement on general principles and social sameness permits vigorous contestation on particulars. Mores and religion provide underlying basis of consensus; small differences permit constant ferment.
  - 2. <u>Question</u>: what sequence of development is most auspicious to this sort of liberal democracy?

# <u>Tocqueville - Lecture 2</u>

# The Private Realm in Democratic Society and The Analysis of Democratic Despotism

## The Private Realm

- I. Individualism; self-interest "properly understood;" isolation
  - 1. Reason for discussion: isolation is best guarantee for despotism; freedom which links men prevents despotism even in a democratic society (DIA 509f). "Liberty engenders particular hatreds, but depotism is responsible for general indifference" (DIA 510).
  - 2. Individualism vs. egoism: former a product of democracy; latter a more extreme form (DIA 506f).
  - 3. Picture of organic society under feudalism: fixed station, ties concrete. "Democracy breaks the chain and frees each link" (DIA 507-8). But NB discussion of gulf between estates under feudalism, solidarity within estates (DIA 561f).
  - 4. Americans use liberty to combat extreme individualism: self-interest in attending to interests of others (DIA 510).
  - 5. In this respect, self-interest "properly understood" is shield against social isolation. Doctrine replaces old aristocratic altruism; lowers moral sights, but is more effective for new social situation: doctrine not sublime, but easily understood and effective. Moralists now look for coincidence of private and public interests [e.g., Smith] (DIA 525ff).
  - 6. Religion also compatible with this sort of view: cf. Pascal (DIA 529).
- J. Associations in a democracy, in an aristocracy
  - 1. Associations in a democracy take role of great men in an aristocracy; form intermediating institutions between central power and individual, protecting latter. Especially necessary in democracy where individual is so isolated and weak (DIA 513f).
  - Another advantage is that associations can undertake important things which individuals cannot, but which are too detailed for central government. NB viscious/virtuous circle maintaining given situation (DIA 515).

- 3. Newspapers (DIA 517f).
- 4. Political associations necessary to permit civil associations in a democracy. The former are not so dangerous in a free democracy as one might think: the "great free schools" which teach liberty: learn civil association (DIA 521ff).
- K. The Industrial aristocracy, and the critique of Adam Smith (DIA 555-8)
- L. Democratic and aristocratic social relations compared
  - 1. Brilliant comparative-historical sociological account of micro relations and the private realm.
  - 2. Note general characterization of differences between aristocratic and democratic social relations: solidarity within estates, not between them under feudalism; no strong ties, but milder relations under democracy (DIA 561ff). NB letters of Mme de Sevigne [cf. Rudolf Hoess]: virtually different races (DIA 563); NB sketch of Englishman and American abroad (DIA 565f).
  - 3. Masters and servants: in aristocracy, virtually separate races, but relations stable and little resentment; in democracy, social boundaries very fluid, and social relations unstable and considerable resentment (DIA 572-80).
  - 4. Class relations: not much to say; cf. industrialists as aristocracy (DIA 580f).
  - 5. Family relations: in democracy, less formalized and more genuine affection, voluntary ties, and family solidarity; in aristocracy, family is link to society, source of power, and interest rather than affection ties family members together (DIA 584f).
  - 6. Girls, women, wives and prostitutes.
    - a. Girls are very independent in democracy (DIA 590).
    - b. Young women in democracy voluntarily give up their independence in contractual form in marriage for much less autonomy than wives in aristocracy. They are considered free actors capable of entering into this agreement (DIA 592f). NB Note U (DIA 731-3) on frontier. NB European contempt for women, while flattering them; reverse in America. NB attitude toward rape, toward sexual equality in America (DIA 600-3).

- c. Picture of virtuous wives and prostitutes: two sides of women's freedom and autonomy in America (DIA 598). Popular licentiousness taken from late absolutist aristocratic licentiousness (DIA 599f).
- 7. The Multitude of small, private circles: privatization. But private sphere shrinks as democratic political realm expands. In contrast to aristocratic society, where classes "resemble great enclosures" with little communication between them, in democracy there are no social barriers and men must form small groups to avoid "being swept along in spite of himself with the crowd" (DIA 604-5).

#### Democratic Despotism

- M. Love of equality, love of liberty (DIA 503ff)
  - 1. Equality and liberty are identical at an extreme point (which may not be reached).
  - 2. Equality is possible in civil society without any in politics, as a kind of slavery under one ruler or king. Also freedom can be found without equality (DIA 503-4).
  - 3. Question of sequence with respect to France: equality came first (under absolutist monarchs) and was firmly established, so when freedom came, passion for it was less (DIA 505f).
  - 4. Quote: democratic peoples have natural taste for liberty, but want equality more in slavery if necessary (DIA 506).
- N. Why democratic revolutions will become rarer (DIA 634ff)
  - 1. In a democracy, equality is more extensive, there are fewer poor, and property-ownership is more widespread. Property owners see more to lose by violent disturbances than they could win: middle classes oppose revolutions (DIA 635f).
  - 2. But NB position of poverty and inequality of blacks: possible source of revolution (DIA 639).
  - 3. Also NB dearth of ideas revolutionary and otherwise. Ideology plays little role in America; greater mediocrity (DIA 640f).
  - 4. Related to potential social isolation of individuals: hinders revolutionary organization (DIA 641f).

- 5. Opposite danger: great conformist pressures and anti-intellectualism, since all differences seen as potential revolutionary danger (DIA 644f).
- O. Dynamic tendencies of democratic society toward freedom or despotism
  - 1. Equality gives men a taste for independence, but may also lead them to free institutions. This love of independence can lead to anarchy, but this is well recognized and protected against; greater danger is of "roundabout and secret but also more certain road…to servitude" to despotism (DIA 667).
  - 2. NB here Hobbes's problematic. As participation rights were expanded as democratization proceeded fear of anarchy led to calls for social order, and for centralization of sovereignty in the Leviathan. Hobbes implicitly noted that, depending on resulting settlement, sovereign could permit greater or lesser liberties (not same concept as Tocqueville, but comparable). Sequence of development will become important here.
  - 3. Concentration of power and centralization of administration becomes central problematic for Tocqueville. Democratic peoples see centralization destruction of secondary powers as desirable hedge against anarchy. With destruction of "natural" secondary bodies of aristocracy, "natural" tendency is toward centralization: secondary associations then have to be "introduced artificially retained with difficulty" (DIA 668). Cf. Hobbes's use of "artificial" and "natural."
  - 4. Causes of centralization.
    - a. Isolation (DIA 671f; cf. individualism).
    - b. Love of public peace (DIA 671f).
    - c. Hatred of priviledge and indifference to centralization (DIA 672f).
    - d. Ruler's tendencies (DIA 678).
    - e. War (DIA 677).
    - f. Needs of industry for infrastructure and control of the workers (DIA 684f).
    - g. Thus, his remark, "I think that in the dawning centuries of democracy, individual independence and local liberties will always be the products of art. Centralized government will be the natural thing" (DIA 674).

- 5. Factors which hinder centralization and maintain liberty.
  - a. Pre-existing liberties which have not been destroyed prior to democratization. Older tradition of liberty in America, brought from English aristocratic tradition (NB DIA 676). In Europe (France) equality was introduced by kings at the same time as they destroyed aristocratic liberties; when question of liberty was raised (in Revolution), it was more shallowly implanted than passion for equality (DIA 674-5).
  - b. Absence of aristocratic priviledges to fight against in America: lack of resentment as a motivating factor giving passion to quest for equality (DIA 676). Cf. Barrington Moore's maxim, "no feudalism, no socialism."
  - c. Also note importance of education and practice in maintaining liberties, and their absence in preventing construction of liberties (DIA 676).
  - d. Thus, question of sequence; dynamic of maintenance vs. causes of development. Question of satisfactoriness of circular account.

## P. Democratic despotism

- 1. His creed: universal uniformity saddens and chills him (DIA 704); advance of democracy fills him with religious dread (DIA 12); disposed to worship freedom; no question of reconstructing aristocratic society, but rather of educating democracy (DIA 695; 12).
- 2. Characterization (DIA 691-2). Danger of further developmental dynamic, in which centralization breeds even more centralization and destruction of freedoms (DIA 694).
- 3. How structurally linked to foregoing: isolation, centralization, destruction of freedoms, repetition of cycle at deeper level. Causes which prevent it also form "virtuous cycle" self-reinforcing dynamic: local associations ("in other words, aristocratic bodies" DIA 697), press, juries, etc.
- 4. How it develops and question of sequence. Problematic of political culture: Mores, institutions, causal direction. Question of internal dynamic which maintains each form and causes which move society from one form to another. Question: how to resolve this contradiction. Attempt at an answer next week.
- 5. Relation of this theory to contemporary literature on fascism, mass society.

## Tocqueville - Lecture 3

#### The Remote Causes of the Revolution

#### Foreword

- 1. The Old Regime already highly centralized and all powerful by the 18th century (viii-ix).
- 2. Purpose of book: (1) why Revolution occurred in France rather than elsewhere; (2) why it presented itself as the almost natural outcome of the social order it sought to destroy; and (3) why the monarchy which had weathered so many storms collapsed so suddenly (x).
- 3. How Revolution turned its back on freedom "to acquiesce in an equality of servitude under the master of all Europe." Government arose much more powerful and more autocratic than previous one, and centralized administration at the expense of liberties. Sovereignty of the people based on electorate without adequate information (xi).
- 4. "My method has been that of the anatomist who dissects each defunct organ with a view to eliciting the laws of life (xii).
- 5. Repeats observations made 20 years ago [in <u>Democracy in America</u>]: (1) ineluctable trend to the destruction of the aristocracy; (2) those peoples which have most trouble getting rid of despotic government are those in which aristocracy has ceased to exist; and (3) nowhere is despotism so likely to arise as among such peoples (xii/f).
- 6. When "the ties of family, of caste, of class, and craft fraternities no longer exist," all tend "to become self-seekers practicing a narrow individualism and caring nothing for the public good." In such societies, money, business careers, mobility, material comforts, and social position become all-important: these "quickly become ruling passions under a despotic government" [emphasis added]; "lower the moral standards of the nation;" "divert men's attention from public affairs;" and are "despotism's safeguard." Despotism provides atmosphere favorable to crooked dealings and "enables the freebooters of finance to make illicit fortunes" (xiii-xiv).
- 7. "Freedom and freedom alone can extirpate these vices, which, indeed, are innate in communities of this order...for only freedom can deliver the members of a community from that isolation which is the lot of the individual left to his own devices and, compelling them to get in touch with each other, promote an active sense of fellowship." In a community of free citizens everyone is led to consider others and seek common interests;

men's minds are lifted above "mere mammon worship," and they are made "aware at every moment that they belong each and all to a vaster entity, above and around them - their native land." In unfree democratic societies, private virtues may flourish, and they may be rich: "But, I make bold to say, never shall we find under such conditions a great citizen, still less a great nation" [emphasis added; NB nationalism here.] (xiv).

<u>Part Two</u> is an examination of the remote causes of the Revolution. Be sure to understand how the following factors differed in pre-Revolutionary France from other cases:

#### A. The condition of feudalism and the peasantry

- 1. growing independence of peasantry: landownership
- 2. declining power of aristocracy in face of central government
- 3. situation in towns similar: old forms retained, but independence gone. Cf. American township (dead, alive creature: p. 48).

#### B. Administrative Centralization

- 1. already well under way in 18th century under the kings
- 2. vast gulf between central government and private citizens (68).
- 3. Rise of Paris; manufacturing.

#### C. Social Stratification and Fragmentation

- 1. Note comparative method in ch. 9-10.
- 2. upper and middle classes became increasingly similar: differed only in their rights (81).
- 3. Cf. England: aristocracy not impoverished there. Kept ties to middle classes and stayed in commercial world (80f, 88f).
- 4. Tax distinctions most pernicious (86). English aristocracy still paid taxes: way to keep power (98). Tax distinctions cause and source of downfall of old regime (98f).
- 5. Retention of burdens of privilege cf. Smith. Also NB military service exemptions (128f).

- 6. status insecurity: due to trivial social distinctions. Has effect of isolating groups even further (89f, 93f). When they came together again, it was on sore spots (107).
- D. The Relation of Equality to Freedom
  - 1. Nature of freedom under old regime: unequal, decentralized, paternalistic.
  - 2. Best suited to resistance to central power (king).
- E. Downfall of absolutist monarchy: nothing could resist it, but nothing could prop it up in time of crisis.

## Tocqueville - Lecture 4

#### The Immediate Causes of the Revolution

<u>Part Three</u> is an examination of the immediate causes of the Revolution. Note how the following factors differed in pre-Revolutionary France from other cases:

## F. The role of intellectuals.

- 1. The Revolution was so radical because, on one side, it was incited by idealistic intellectuals, and on the other side, it was carried out by the least educated and unruly elements neither of which groups had contact with each other (OR 206f).
- 2. Reform programs advocated by 18th century intellectuals entailed the "belief that what was wanted was to replace the complex of traditional customs governing the social order of the day by simple, elementary rules deriving from the exercise of the human reason and natural law" (OR 139).
- 3. Reasons why these abstract concepts which were far from new now for the first time took hold among the masses, and how the intellectuals men without wealth or status became the leading politicians of the day.
  - a. The intellectuals were struck by the "absurd and unjust privileges" whose causes they did not understand, and by the "ramshackle institutions, survivals of an earlier age" (OR 140). That is, by the situation left after absolutism had centralized administration and aristocrats had renounced their responsibilities but retained their rights and exemptions.
  - b. However, the whole way of living of the intellectuals put them "quite out of touch with practical politics" (OR 140): they thus had no appreciation of the obstacles to their reforms; and they were unable to "hear the voice of public opinion" (OR 141). Their schemes thus became even more extreme.
  - c. One freedom remained: the freedom of discussion of abstract political theory. Thereby, leadership of public opinion fell to the intellectuals. The aristocracy had lost this leadership (OR 141f).
  - d. In England, political theorists and practicing politicians cooperated with each other, and learned from each other (OR 145f).

## G. The Position of the Church.

- 1. Parallel developments with regard to the Church.
- 2. Note that the Church was no worse in France than elsewhere (OR 150).
- 3. But the Church had identified itself too closely with the absolutist Old Regime, and the Church was the main ideological opponent of the intellectuals. "In championing freedom of thought for all against the Church they were fighting their own battle" (OR 152).
- 4. Note also how when the old nobility and then the bourgeoisie realized that they were in danger, they hypocritically rallied to the defense of religion, although they had previously been its strongest critics (OR 154f).
- 5. The void left by religion was filled promptly, if temporarily, by the Intellectuals' belief in reason and in themselves (OR 156). They were idealistic extremists: "the first of a new race of men," who are still with us (OR 157).
- H. <u>The question of reform and liberty.</u> Why, in other words, the desire for political liberty "in the full sense of the term" was the last to emerge and the first to pass away (OR 157).
  - 1. The 18th-century Physiocrats and Economists were the precursors of the Revolutionary intellectuals. They attacked all privilege and diversity, believing in equality at all costs, even in servitude. They were for laissez faire in economics, but political liberty did not occur to them; they were against all intermediate bodies (OR 158f).
  - 2. NB they were Smithians and Lockeans in a way that Tocqueville denies that Smith and Locke (Englishmen in an English context) were.
  - 3. But also NB Tocqueville's affinity to Hobbes and Machiavelli rather than Locke and Smith in this regard: an attraction to the practical and sociological rather than the ideal and logical. In this respect, the Physiocrats (and also Locke and to an extent, Smith) were more closely related to medieval thinking (adherence to Reason, Natural Law) than were the sociological thinkers.
  - 4. According to the Economists, the function of the State was not merely to rule the nation, but to reform and transform the mentality of all (OR 162). The Economists championed what is now called "democratic despotism:" they stressed absolute equality under an all powerful central authority (OR 163). Socialism and centralization thrive on the same soil (OR 164).

- 5. Thus, by the mid-18th century, the French had lost their enthusiasm for liberty. When 20 years later, there was a sudden rise of the desire for freedom, esp for the Estates-General (OR 165), "A nation so unused to acting for itself was bound to begin by wholesale destruction when it launched into a program of wholesale reform." It destroyed many institutions inimical to freedom, but also many necessary to freedom (OR 167).
- 6. By the time the ancient love of freedom had reawakened in the French, they had already come to believe in institutions inimical to liberty: "They had come to regard the ideal social system as one whose aristocracy consisted exclusively of government officials and in which an all-powerful bureaucracy not only took charge of affairs of State but controlled men's private lives." They proposed to combine liberty with these institutions by "combining a strong central administration with a paramount legislative assembly. Since this was internally contradictory, the French were frustrated in their attempts (OR 167f).
- 7. "The result has been that, wearied of these vain attempts and the efforts involved, many Frenchmen have lost their taste for freedom and come to think that, after all, an autocratic government under which all men are equal has something to be said for it. (OR 168).
- 8. Tocqueville's credo, again: Freedom has an "intrinsic glamour" which makes men fight for it; but "the man who asks of freedom anything other than itself is born to be a slave" (OR 168-9).
- I. The question of rising expectations and of the rate of change.
  - 1. This is Tocqueville's famous theory of the Revolution of Rising Expectations which he never called by that name.
  - 2. He says two main things about it:
    - a. Revolutions break out not when things are going from bad to worse. "On the contrary, it oftener happens that when a people which has put up with an oppressive rule over a long period without protest suddenly finds the government relaxing its pressure, it takes up arms against it....Generally speaking, the most perilous moment for a bad government is one when it seeks to mend its ways....Patiently endured so long as it seemed beyond redress, a grievance comes to appear intolerable once the possibility of removing it crosses men's minds. For the mere fact that certain abuses have been remedied draws attention to the others and they now appear more galling; people may suffer less, but their sensibility is exacerbated" (OR 176f).

- b. When government took on so many new responsibilities for regulating society, it made mismanagement more obvious (OR 178f). Similar distrust of reason embodied in the State as expressed by Smith.
- 3. Also NB how the political Revolution was actually begun as an administrative revolution by precisely those elements which stood most to lose: the King and his bureaucrats (and intellectuals).
- 4. For 140 years, the French people had played no political role, but those who had most to fear from the anger of the masses had no qualms about publicly condemning their oppression (OR 180).
- 5. Upper classes began to show philanthropic concern for the poor before the latter threatened them. This was, however, mixed with contempt (OR 183f). The effect of this on the peasant was clear: he was moved by consciousness of his greater numbers and by his envy (OR 186f).
- 6. The abrupt, wholesale remodeling of the administration which preceded the Revolution was one of the greatest upheavals in French history: it affected the social base. In England, the Revolution only affected the apex, not the social base (OR 201f).
- J. The results of the Revolution. Tocqueville's summary of his argument.
  - 1. Brilliant summary of his analysis.
    - a. The nobility had lost their political rights and power, but had retained and increased their privileges and exemptions. They became less an aristocracy and more a caste. They deliberately cut themselves off from the middle class and the peasantry (OR 204). The monarchy abolished all provincial autonomy and brought the most trivial affairs under its central control in Paris (OR 204).
    - b. Political thought was thoroughly stifled: private citizen completely out of touch with public affairs. There were no experienced political parties or groups which could lead the masses, who came entirely under the control of philosophers or intellectuals. Revolution thus took the form of abstract principles (OR 205).
    - c. Since the Church was so closely bound up with the Old Regime, it was bound to be swept away and that the Revolution should assail established religion (OR 205).
    - d. Peasantry had been oppressed for so long that when it was enabled to rule it did so ruthlessly (OR 207).

- 2. In his concluding remarks, he returns to his favorite theme of liberty versus equality.
  - a. Two ruling passions in 18th century France: the more deeply rooted and long-standing was the hatred of inequality; the more recent and less deeply rooted was the desire for freedom. Toward the end of the Old Regime, both passions were equally felt (OR 207f).
  - b. After the "virile generation which had launched the Revolution had perished," and after a spell of anarchy and "popular" dictatorship, the ideal of freedom lost much of its appeal, and the nation began to "cast round for a master." The ground was prepared for the return of one-man government (OR 208f).
  - c. All the centralizing institutions of the Old Regime were quite modern and moreover, amenable to equality: they "offered remarkable facilities to despotism." "Thus there arose, within a nation that had but recently laid low its monarchy, a central authority with powers wider, stricter, and more absolute than those which any French King had ever wielded....Napoleon fell but the more solid parts of his achievement lasted on; his government died, but his administration survived, and every time that an attempt is made to do away with absolutism the most that could be done has been to graft the head of Liberty onto a servile body" (OR 209).
  - d. From Revolution to Tocqueville's time: the passion for freedom has flared up time and again, but it is "undisciplined and untutored by experience; so easily discouraged, cowed and vanquished, so superficial and short-lived." The passion for equality runs much deeper and always remains (OR 209f).